Utopian Visions toward a Grand Unified Global Income Tax by Ordower, Henry
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2013
Utopian Visions toward a Grand Unified Global
Income Tax
Henry Ordower
Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ordower, Henry, Utopian Visions Toward a Grand Unified Global Income Tax (2013). Florida Tax Review, Vol. 14, No. 5, 361 - 418
(2013).
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utopian Visions toward a Grand Unified Global Income Tax  
 
Henry Ordower 
Professor of Law 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
St. Louis, Missouri, USA 
 
  
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 2 
 
 
A grand unified global income tax (GUGIT) may prove as elusive as the grand unified 
theory (GUT) that physicists have sought for many years.
1
  Yet, just as recent discoveries bring 
physicists closer to a GUT,
2
 developments in the international financial and tax worlds may 
move a GUGIT into imaginable reach.  Since the discussions of a global unified corporate tax 
base in the early 1990s,
3
 significant and often surprising changes have taken place in the 
financial and tax worlds.  To name just a few of those changes, the European Union (EU) 
expanded eastward to include many of the former Soviet satellite countries;
4
 seventeen member 
states of the EU,
5
 including several from the eastward expansion,
6
 eliminated their national 
currencies in favor of a single common currency;
7
 the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
                                                 
1
 A Grand Unified Theory (GUT) refers to attempts to explain electromagnetic, strong and weak forces under a 
single theory.  To date, physicists have not accounted successfully for the three forces in a single theory.  Dan 
Hooper, Nature’s Blueprint:  Supersymmetry and the Search for a Unified Theory of Matter and Force 137-38 
(ebook edition) (New York 2008). 
The search for a GUT began long before construction of the CERN Large Hadron Collider began.  CERN 
is the acronym for Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire, the European Organization for Nuclear Research.  
CERN built the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) on the Switzerland-France border.  The collider became operational 
in 2008 but CERN does not plan to operate it for significant research until 2014.  Information about CERN and the 
Large Hadron collider is available at http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/About/About-en.html.  When fully 
operational, the collider should provide experimental evidence that will confirm or refute many theoretical positions 
concerning the nature and interaction of subatomic particles.  The failure to produce conclusive experimental 
evidence that a GUT exists does not deter particle physicists from continuing to strive for a theory, conduct particle 
collision experiments and develop applications for the data from the particle accelerators.   
2
 Recently, CERN scientists announced a breakthrough as they discovered a particle that may be the Higgs boson.  
On Wednesday, July 4, 2012, scientists at CERN announced the possible discovery of the Higgs Boson particle that 
would be critical to the GUT at the LHC.  THE NEW YORK TIMES A1 (July 5, 2012).  According to an explanation 
on the CERN website, the Higgs boson is the – possibly no longer hypothetical – particle giving gave mass to the 
massless particles the Big Bang created.  http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/science/higgs-en.html 
3
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation,’’ TAX NOTES, 
Mar. 15, 1993, p. 1511; Eric J. Coffill and Prentiss Wilson Jr., ‘‘Federal Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative 
to Arm’s Length Pricing: From the Frying Pan to the Fire?’’ TAX NOTES, May 24, 1993, p. 1103.  William J. 
Wilkins and Kenneth W. Gideon, Congress: You Wouldn’t Like Worldwide Formula Apportionment, Tax Notes 
1351 (June 11, 2012) (republished from the Dec. 5, 1994 issue of TAX NOTES) (marshaling arguments against 
worldwide formulary apportionment of corporate business income and labeling the concept a “design for 
disagreement.”); and Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 TAX L. 
REV. 691 (1994) (describing unitary taxation for North America).  More recent discussion of worldwide taxation and 
cross-border formulary apportionment appears in the literature on reform of U.S. taxation, including Julie Roin, Can 
the Income Tax Be Saved?  The Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 Tax L. 
Rev. 169 (2008); Reuven S.Avi Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for 
Tax Purposes:  A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 497 (2009); Susan C. Morse, 
Revisiting Formulary Apportionment, 29 Va. Tax. Rev. 593 (2010). 
4
 In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU, as 
well as non-Soviet satellite countries Cyprus and Malta.   Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/from-6-to-27-members/index_en.htm 
5
 EC, Economic and Financial Affairs, The euro (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm) (showing Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Estonia as 
euro zone countries).  
6
 Id.    (Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia) 
7
 Id.     The Euro became available for financial transactions in 1999 with banknotes and coins appearing in 2002.  
Eleven EU states adopted the Euro in 1999 with an additional six joining the currency union at various times later.  
Countries using the euro retain control over their own economies but “they undertake to adhere to commonly agreed 
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 3 
 
and Development (OECD) shamed and coerced many tax havens into cooperating in the 
exchange of information in tax matters;
8
 Switzerland and Liechtenstein began to negotiate 
limitations on the protection they offered to foreign investors under their financial institution 
secrecy laws; Russia’s suspension of payments on its sovereign debt in 1998 driving the failure 
of major investment pools and their managers
9
 and the subprime crisis in the United States in 
2007 leading to the financial crisis in 2008
10
 threatened to undermine the world economy and 
brought the concept of systemic risk to prominence; in the United States, the 2008 financial crisis 
led to enactment of systemic risk focused regulation of the economy;
11
 the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted a proposed rule to converge and convert financial reporting in the 
United States
12
 from generally accepted accounting principles
13
 to international financial 
reporting standards;
14
 and the European Commission (EC) took the first definitive step toward 
cross border combined income tax reporting in the EU.
15
  While barriers to development of a 
working GUGIT may be just as formidable as barriers to discovery of a GUT, this paper argues 
that each step toward a GUGIT is a step toward tax transparency, distributional fairness, and 
public acceptance of the legitimacy of the income tax system.   
 
 Amidst the clamor in recent decades to abandon historically progressive taxation
16
 in 
favor of proportional and regressive taxation,
17
 the hum of progressive taxation remains faintly 
                                                                                                                                                             
rules on public finances known as the Stability and Growth Pact.”  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm.   
8
 The initial step was the issuance of a report on tax havens, OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION AN EMERGING 
GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) (available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf). 
9
 Long Term Capital Mangement. 
10
 For a discussion of the events leading to the financial crisis, see National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (Washington DC, 
2011) (available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf). 
11
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L 111–203 (7-10-2010).  
12
 SEC Proposed Rulemaking, Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by U.S. Issuers, Rel. Nos. 33-8982; 34-58960 (Nov. 14, 2008).  
More recently, however, the SEC’s support for a U.S. transition to IFRS has wavered.  SEC, Final Staff Report, 
Work Plan for the Consideration of Incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards into the Financial 
Reporting System for U.S. Issuers (July 13, 2012) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-final-report.pdf) (not recommending 
adoption of IFRS, but recommending further work toward convergence of GAAP and IFRS.  See further discussion 
infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
13
 Referred to as GAAP and including fairly detailed rules for financial reporting.   
14
 Referred to as IFRS and based upon general principles of reporting rather than specific rules. 
15
 The first meeting of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Working Group (CCCTB WG) 
took place on November 24, 2004.  The agenda for that meeting is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/article_2336_en.htm.  The EC’s 
establishment of its CCCTB WG was the impetus to the commentary,  
16
 The classic work cataloging arguments for progressive taxation is Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., THE 
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (Chicago, 1953).  The German Constitutional Court, in holding that 
taxpayers whose jobs and family structure required them to maintain two residences permanently must be treated the 
same as taxpayers whose secondary residence was purportedly temporary but who might have a series of temporary 
placements, observed with respect to horizontal and vertical equity that:  “… taxpayers who have the same ability to 
pay should be taxed equally (horizontal tax equity), while (in the vertical direction) taxation of higher incomes 
should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes.  Decision of  December 4, 2002, BVerfGE 107, 27, 46.  
Author’s translation.  Emphasis added.  The German reads:  “…Steuerpflichtige bei gleicher Leistungsfähigkeit 
auch gleich hoch zu besteuern (horizontale Steuergerechtigkeit), während (in vertikaler Richtung) die Besteuerung 
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audible.
18
  Tax competition and mobility of capital have led many countries to decrease the tax 
burden on capital and capital income and increase the burden on the less mobile tax bases of 
labor 
19
 and consumption.
 20
  Some commentators argue that taxing capital at all is inefficient as 
it causes taxpayers to engage in tax arbitrage
21
 and shift capital income to low tax jurisdictions, 
often through favorable transfer prices.
22
   
 
Transfer pricing has proven particularly problematic for tax collectors.  Transfer pricing 
refers to the price that one member of a group of related entities (or individuals and entities) 
charges another member of the group for goods or services where the group members are in 
different jurisdictions.  Since the parties to the transaction are related, they do not negotiate at 
arms’ length in determining the correct price for the goods or services but may select a price that 
places the income from the transaction in the jurisdiction extracting the lowest tax.
23
  Most high 
tax jurisdictions require that the taxpayer establish that its transfer prices are the prices that it 
would pay or receive, as the case may be, in an arms’ length negotiation.24  Satisfactorily 
combatting artificiality in transfer prices often has proven challenging and costly for tax 
collectors.  Taxpayers having significant income from exploitation of their intellectual and other 
                                                                                                                                                             
höherer Einkommen im Vergleich mit der Steuerbelastung niedriger Einkommen angemessen sein muss.”  For 
further discussion of the decision, see Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional 
Principles:  Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 303-5 (2006).  But see James Repetti 
and Diane Ring, HORIZONTAL EQUITY REVISITED, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 135 (2012) (reviewing the literature and arguing 
that horizontal equity has not normative content and most likely is only part of the vertical equity concept). 
17
 OECD Tax Policy Studies, Fundamental Reform of Personal Income Tax 7 (Paris, 2006) (identifying trends in tax 
rates in OECD countries):Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax, Value-Added Tax, and National Retail Sales Tax:  
Overview of the Issues, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, RL 32603 (2008) (identifying issues and 
distributional concerns in tax restructuring); Alvin E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, THE FLAT TAX (Stanford 1995) 
(arguing for a flat rate of tax with an exemption at the lower end); Michael J. Graetz, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY 
RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (New Haven 2008) (proposing a 
value added tax and exempting all but the highest income individuals from any income tax in order to preserve 
minimal progressivity). 
18
 Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, THE NEW YORK TIMES A 21 (August 15, 2011) (editorial 
arguing that very wealthy individuals are under-taxed especially on their income from capital). 
19
 Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Capital income vs. labour income:  An overview in Sĳbren Cnossen ed., TAXING 
CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 15, 24 (Oxford 2000). 
20
 For example, the share of governmental revenues that the value added tax produced in Sweden from the year 2000 
to 2010 increased gradually from 16.88 percent to 21.29 percent.  European Commission Taxation and Customs 
Union, available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tedb/taxDetail.html?id=531/1330473600&taxType=VAT.  
During the same period, the personal income tax in Sweden accounted for a decreasing percentage of tax revenue, 
declining from 29.86 percent to 25.28 percent.  Id.    available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tedb/taxDetail.html?id=1701/1330905600&taxType=PIT.  Taxes on capital 
decreased even more with the elimination of both the wealth tax and the estate tax.  In addition, recent financial 
crises and risks that governments like Greece and Spain will default on sovereign debt suggest that governments are 
relying more heavily on sovereign debt to offset shortfalls in tax revenue.   
21
 Tax arbitrage refers to the practice of consciously exploiting difference in tax rules from one taxing jurisdiction to 
another by constructing transactions to capture taxpayer beneficial elements of differing tax rules.  See, generally, 
Gene Steuerle, Tax Shelters and Tax Arbitrage, 95 Tax Notes 1249 (May 20, 2002) (explaining tax arbitrage and its 
leveraging effect).  
22
 See, generally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Diane M. Ring, and Yariv Brauner, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:  
CASES AND MATERIALS at 192 et seq. (New York 2011).   
23
 Id. 
24
 OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2010). 
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intangible properties, including goodwill, have been particularly adept at establishing transfer 
prices that place that income in low tax jurisdictions.
25
   
 
In addition to the efficiency argument and the impact of tax competition are arguments 
against taxing capital income because much capital income is not real income since it is 
attributable to the effect of inflation and because taxing capital is taxing labor a second time 
since taxes on capital are taxes on savings of the income from labor.
26
  The arguments for not 
taxing income from capital are unpersuasive.  If the tax reached only the current portion of 
capital income, interest for the use of capital, for example, only that part of the interest in excess 
of the nominal rate for the use of capital would be attributable to inflation.  That same excess 
manifests itself in wages and living costs, however, as well as the return on capital.  The 
argument not to tax the inflation portion of yield on capital is equally an argument not to tax part 
of wage increases.  The inflation argument with respect to capital appreciation is also flawed 
since the simple fix to bring that in line with wage increases is elimination of the realization 
requirement for taxing gains on property and substituting a broad mark to market regime for all 
assets.
27
  The argument that capital represents savings from labor income, so that taxing capital 
income is taxing frugal wage earners a second time,
28
 also is weak.  Most wage earners have 
little opportunity to save, so that savings and investment take place primarily in the higher 
income groups and much is from reinvested capital income.
29
  Moreover, the higher earning 
groups sometimes even find ways to convert income from their services into preferred capital 
income.
30
 
 
Transfer pricing and other tax arbitrage opportunities would diminish substantially if 
there were no income tax on capital but only at the cost of increased value added taxes on 
consumption and increased taxes on labor tax sufficient to replace the lost revenue from 
elimination of the tax on capital.  The presence of the high value added taxes in turn would 
generate incentives to purchase and consume outside the high tax jurisdiction whenever possible.  
High taxes on wages create incentives at all levels to evade taxes by not reporting cash and barter 
income,
31
 and, at high wage levels, to convert income from services into income from capital 
                                                 
25
 The OECD recently announced a discussion draft of transfer pricing guidelines for intangibles.  OECD Working 
Party No. 6 releases a discussion draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_33753_50509929_1_1_1_1,00.html) (June 6, 2012).  The final 
report from the working group would supplement the OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, id.. 
26
 Gordon, supra note 19, at 17 - 21(surveying the academic literature arguing against taxing income from capital).  . 
27
 Compare, I.R.C. §1256 (marking to market and including in income (or loss) the annual appreciation or 
depreciation in the value of certain commodities and other gains). 
28
 Gordon, supra note 19, at 19. 
29
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/tables.htm 
(providing data on expenditures in various income groups in the U.S.).  . 
30
 Consider the recent discussion of carried interests that found its way into the 2012 Presidential campaign.  See, 
generally, See, generally, Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2008) (arguing that some or all the profits a partnership allocates to service provider 
partners is ordinary income from services rather than a distributive share of the partnership’s income). 
31
 The underground or shadow economy refers to payments that do not use the national or international banking 
system in order to avoid detection and taxation. Friedrich Schneider &Dominik Enste, HIDING IN THE SHADOWS: 
THE GROWTH OF THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 1-5 (2002) (explaining the concept of the shadow economy, 
estimating the underground economy around the world, estimating the underground economy at 10% of gross 
domestic product in the United States during the 1999-2001 period, and identifying steep growth from 1970-2000).   
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wherever possible.
32
  Individuals whose provision of services is not tied to the specific physical 
location also may relocate physically to a lower tax jurisdiction.
33
  Individuals with the ability to 
relocate in that manner are likely to come from the high income or wealth segments of the 
society.   
 
This paper will argue that a GUGIT likewise solves the problem of tax arbitrage and 
transfer pricing without sacrificing the progressive income tax.  A GUGIT would diminish 
opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage because tax rules would be uniform across jurisdictions.  
A GUGIT also would eliminate most opportunities to exploit transfer pricing since the GUGIT 
would use a robust taxpayer group concept
34
 and exclude all intra-group transactions from the 
tax base and the formula for distributing the base among nations.  Members of a taxpayer group 
would have a group tax base that the GUGIT would apportion among the members of the 
group.
35
 
 
Seeking a GUGIT in the 2012 world is a far different matter from seeking a GUGIT in 
1994.  In 2012, the concept, if not all the details, of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) has embedded itself in the world’s largest aggregate economy, the EU.36  The EC 
proposed the CCCTB Working Group’s (CCCTB WG) recommendations for an elective 
common consolidated corporate tax base
37
 and the European Parliament (EP) modified and 
adopted the proposal for the enactment of a mandatory, rather than the EC’s proposed voluntary, 
CCCTB with a five year phase in.
38
  Unlike the 1994 world that was nearly devoid of 
international cooperation on tax transparency and information sharing, ever increasing 
                                                 
32
 Supra note 30. 
33
 See discussion infra in part 3.C. 
34
 Infra   part 3.B. 
35
 Infra   part 3.A. B. 
36
 The combined member states of the EU have the largest aggregate gross domestic product in the world, 
constituting nearly twenty percent of the worldwide GDP.  Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 
(updated weekly online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html) ( estimating 
the world purchasing power GDP at approximately $79 trillion in 2011 and the EU GDP at $15.4 trillion, with the 
U.S. a close second at $15 trillion).   
37
 See, European Commission, Brussels, COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS)Proposal for a COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (2011) at 14, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/com_2011_12
1_en.pdf. (CCCTB Proposal in the following).  The EC describes the proposal on its website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm as follows:   
The European Commission on 16 March 2011 proposed a common system for calculating the tax 
base of businesses operating in the EU. 
 
The proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), would mean that companies 
would benefit from a "one-stop-shop" system for filing their tax returns and would be able to 
consolidate all the profits and losses they incur across the EU. Member States would maintain 
their full sovereign right to set their own corporate tax rate. 
38
 EP, Legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS) (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0135&language=EN&ring=A7-
2012-0080) (EP CCCTB resolution).   
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international cooperation on tax information sharing characterizes the 2012 world.
 39
   Yet, 
despite advances in information sharing, tax competition and tax avoidance have rendered the 
need for better assessment and collection methods compelling.  The primary goals of those 
improved methods are to prevent wealthier taxpayers from avoiding tax and to restore public 
confidence that the distribution of tax burden is fair.  Without some fundamental change in the 
income tax system, the public perception of the tax system as favoring the wealthy and powerful 
is likely to continue to grow
40
 as will the shadow economy and its accompanying loss of tax 
revenue.
41
  A GUGIT just might offer the solution as it diminishes concealment of income and 
limits cross border tax arbitrage.  To the extent people who participate extensively in the 
underground economy do so to level the playing field with wealthier people who are able to 
capture favorable tax treatment within existing tax systems, the GUGIT may diminish the 
underground economy as well. 
 
This paper offers an overview of many of the issues that a GUGIT raises and explains 
why current global trends suggest that most of those issues no longer are a barrier to adoption of 
a GUGIT.  The paper does not provide a detailed GUGIT proposal but builds on the work of the 
CCCTB WG and its detailed proposal for a CCCTB.
42
  Part 1 of this paper defines the GUGIT 
concept and describes its contours and limitations.  Part 2 confronts the critical issue of national 
sovereignty under a centralized reporting and collection system.  Part 2 also addresses 
incentivizing countries to accommodate a GUGIT as well as the more general considerations of 
the relinquishment of personal freedom that would be essential to the successful operation of the 
GUGIT.  Part 3 reviews several of the technical objections to a GUGIT including the 
methodology for allocating and apportioning income among jurisdictions, currency conversions, 
accounting and language translation matters.  Part 4 argues that international agreement to a 
uniform set of tax rules is not quite so unattainable as it might seem because national tax laws 
tend to converge internationally in any event.  Nations increasingly borrow successful elements 
from the tax laws of other countries and follow the models that other nations establish.
43
  Part 5 
concerns itself with the economic displacements and revenue losses that are likely to arise from 
transition to a GUGIT.  Part 6 concludes that economic globalization has created the conditions 
essential to development of a global tax system.  Converging income tax rules internationally 
make it possible to negotiate uniform rules while acceptance of international cooperation on 
information sharing in tax matters has become sufficiently established and essential to prevent 
tax avoidance that national sovereignty as a barrier to a GUGIT quickly is weakening.  A 
GUGIT while utopian (or dystopian if the GUGIT would limit the taxpayer’s planning 
                                                 
39
 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Progress Report to the 
G20 (Global Forum Progress Report) (Los Cabos 2012) (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/8/50630814.pdf) (identifying significant increase in tax transparency and 
automatic information exchange including jurisdictions that formerly were non-cooperative tax havens). 
40
 See, generally, Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 SAINT LOUIS U L J 47, 115-125 (2010) 
(discussing public perceptions of tax rates and fairness and expressing general willingness to avoid and often evade 
taxes). 
41
 See supra note 31 discussing the underground economy. 
42
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37. 
43
 Compare the proliferation of general anti-avoidance rules during the most recent year tax history.  See, generally, 
Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 40, at 94-103. 
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opportunities) also may be possible so that development of a model and commencement of 
negotiations lies in the near, not distant, future.   
 
Part 1.  What is a GUGIT and how would it work?  A GUGIT provides rules to 
identify the taxpayer, rules to compute the taxpayer’s income, and rules to distribute the power to 
tax the taxpayer’s income among the jurisdictions in which the taxpayer receives or accrues 
income.  First the GUGIT must determine the identity of the taxpayer.  The taxpayer might be a 
single individual or entity or a more complex combination of multiple individuals or entities.  
Once the GUGIT identifies the taxpayer, it may determine the tax base that it will distribute 
under a comprehensive set of uniform rules of inclusion in and exclusion from income, as well as 
rules for characterization of special types of income -- capital income, for example.
44
  In 
addition, a GUGIT uniformly sorts a taxpayer’s expenditures among currently deductible 
expenses, capital expenditures, and expenditures unrelated to income production.  With respect 
to capital expenditures the GUGIT governs when the taxpayer may recover those expenditures 
for tax purposes either by allowing a gradual recovery under uniform rules for depreciation and 
amortization, by absorbing the expenditures into inventory cost recoverable as part of the cost of 
goods the taxpayer sells, or by including the expenditure in the tax cost of property that the 
taxpayer recovers for tax purposes when the taxpayer disposes of the property.  With respect to 
those expenditures that do not relate to the production of income, the GUGIT reserves those 
items for national or local decisions on deductibility.  After determining the taxpayer’s income 
and reducing it by the deductible and currently recoverable amounts of expenditures, the GUGIT 
distributes the tax base under a uniform set of rules among all countries in which the taxpayer 
produces income.
45
   
 
Each country might provide additional deductions for the taxpayer’s non-income 
producing expenditures, charitable contribution deductions, for example, and possibly other 
adjustments unrelated to the production of income – personal deductions, a subsistence minimum 
free of tax with respect to its share of the taxpayer's tax base.
46
  Each country would impose its 
income tax on the net amount remaining after those deductions.  Current differences among 
countries in the defining expenditures as personal and most likely non-deductible or related to 
                                                 
44
 Many income tax systems distinguish income from capital from income from labor and tax the different types of 
income at different rates.  The US, for example, taxes gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets that a taxpayer 
has held for more than a year and certain dividends at a lower rate of tax than it taxes income from labor.  Section 
1(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code,” constituting the tax laws of the U.S., Title 26 
of the United States Code).  This paper refers to provisions of the Code as I.R.C. § followed by a number.  Germany 
also taxes capital gain at a favorable rate relative to labor income but taxes other income from capital, including 
interest, royalties, and dividends at the same favored rate.  Einkommensteuergesetz vom 8. Oktober 2009, als 
geändert (EStG) (Income Tax Law of 10/8/09, as amended) (available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/estg/gesamt.pdf) § 2(1) 5. (capital as a tax class); § 20 (defining capital wealth); § 32d 
(imposing a 25 percent preferential rate on income from capital).  
45
 Part 3 infra will provide more detail on the structure of the uniform tax base and its shares. 
46
 Where a taxpayer is subject to tax in multiple jurisdictions, status deductions or exemptions like personal 
exemptions and standard deductions assure that each taxpayer retains an amount of income free from tax.  In order 
to prevent duplication of those items in multiple jurisdictions, countries would allocate the items in proportion to 
their respective shares of the tax base.  Most states of the U.S. currently do that type of allocation with their personal 
exemption amounts, for example, Illinois under 35 ILCS 5/204. 
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income production and deductible or capitalizable might result in difficult negotiations toward a 
uniform rule, but, once settled, there would be a rule applicable universally.
47
  
 
Under stabile global rules, the economic displacements that have accompanied the 
frequent changes in national tax laws stop.
48
  The tax future becomes predictable, so that pricing 
of property and services need no longer anticipate tax regulatory changes.  Individuals and 
entities may adjust their operations to accommodate those stabile rules.  Predictable outcomes 
even if dystopian to some or many participants in the world economy seem preferable to 
uncertainty.  Governments need only adjust their tax rates to raise necessary revenue as changes 
in tax rules become a function of worldwide negotiation rather than local political considerations.   
 
A uniform base should diminish much tax competition among nations.  Cross border tax 
arbitrage to exploit characterization differences would disappear.  While the GUGIT would not 
regulate the rate of tax that a country might impose on capital income, for example, it would fix 
the definition of capital income applicable in all jurisdictions.
49
  Without regard to location, 
expensing and rules of capital recovery through amortization and depreciation would be identical 
as would rules governing capitalization of expenditures.  No country would be able to use 
favorable rates of depreciation, current expensing, or income exclusion from specific activities in 
order to attract investment.   
 
Taxpayers may continue to shift portions of their tax base to lower tax jurisdictions in 
order to diminish their tax burdens.  However, the GUGIT distributes income among 
jurisdictions on the basis of measurable factors so that shifting income means shifting those 
factors to the lower rate jurisdiction.
50
  In apportioning business income among jurisdictions, 
both the states of the United States and the CCCTB proposal rely on factors that include sales 
and, in most instances, property and payroll.
51
  A taxpayer wishing to shift income to a lower rate 
jurisdiction would have to shift its production or relinquish sales opportunities in higher tax 
                                                 
47
 For example, commuting expenses in the U.S. are personal and not deductible as business expenses, I.R.C. §262, 
(although when the employer pays them, I.R.C. §132(a)(5), the employer may deduct the payment, but the employee 
does not have to include them in her income) while in Germany commuting expenses are deductible business 
expenses subject to a statutory limit, EStG, supra note 44, § 9(1) 4.  Similarly, considerable variations of the 
treatment of child care expenses exist, sometimes in a single tax system.  In the U.S., there is a partial tax credit and 
also an exclusion if the employee pays for the child care with cafeteria plan funds under I.R.C. §125.  Two-thirds of 
childcare costs (not to exceed 4000 € per child) for childcare to age 14 are deductible in Germany.  EStG § 10(1) 5. 
48
 See discussion of economic displacement infra in part 5. 
49
 Many jurisdictions tax capital income at a preferential rate, but the jurisdictions currently do not define capital 
income uniformly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See note 44 supra.   
50
 Apportionment of income under any formula still may give rise to disputes.  See, for example, Peter L. Faber, 
International Formulary Apportionment Is Not a Panacea, 136 Tax Notes 615 (July 30, 2012) (arguing based on 
experience with formulary apportionment among the states of the U.S. that disputes will continue on transfer pricing 
despite formulary apportionment). 
51
 While the states of the U.S. use differing apportionment factors for business income, all include sales as a factor, 
and those using multiple factors use property and payroll as well.  The CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, apportions 
business income by equally weighted property, sales, and employment factors, but, in order to level the effect of 
wage differentials among member states, the employment factor is a combination of payroll and numbers of 
employees. 
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 10 
 
jurisdictions in order to do so.  If, as several commentators recommend,
52
 the GUGIT adopted a 
destination sales factor only apportionment formula, income shifting becomes impractical 
without loss of revenue.  Preventing income shifting with a single destination sales factor 
disadvantages poorer countries as they tend to be producing but not consuming countries.  Those 
producing countries might lose their tax base to consuming countries.
53
  In any event, an income 
distribution formula that is a function of real factors such as payroll, property and sales would 
make the decision to shift income less artificial than it is currently.   
 
A GUGIT also would impact income shifting among members of enterprise groups 
insofar as the GUGIT consolidates the incomes of all members of an enterprise group.
54
  By 
eliminating intra-group transactions, the GUGIT restricts tax planning opportunities that rely on 
intra-group transfer prices.  Formulary apportionment of income of the enterprise group’s 
aggregate income replaces arms’ length determinations of transfer prices.  Payments from one 
group member to another, whether as sales, interest, dividends, or royalties similarly would not 
impact the distribution of income among jurisdictions.  Instead the income would follow the 
apportionment factors of the group as a whole.  Groups would be free to require intra group 
payments in order to redistribute the tax burden, but those payments would not impact the tax 
base distribution. 
 
Since the distribution methodology renders it difficult to manipulate the geographic 
placement of income, tax competition might continue but would link closely to real investment 
in the taxing jurisdiction.  When low-income countries deliver incentives to foreign direct 
investment with tax incentives, they no longer risk losing the intended effect of the benefit to the 
home country’s credit-based foreign tax regime.  Tax sparing treaty provisions become 
unnecessary to protect the low-income country’s incentives.55  Yet, some leveling of tax rates is 
likely to follow.  Countries losing investment may conform their rates more closely to countries 
gaining investment, so that cross-border competition becomes a function primarily of factors 
such as labor costs and direct subsidies rather tax rates.  In its discussion of the CCCTB 
Proposal, the EP saw the harmonization of rates within a range as a natural complement to the 
CCCTB.
56
  In addition, higher tax jurisdictions may encourage or pressure lower tax jurisdictions 
to harmonize their rates with those of the higher tax jurisdictions, as high tax jurisdictions 
recently coerced tax havens to provide greater transparency, information reporting and other 
features necessary to prevent “harmful tax competition.”57   
                                                 
52
.Avi Yonah,. Clausing &. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes, supra note 3; Morse, Revisiting 
Formulary Apportionment, supra note 3. 
53
 See discussion infra in Part 3.A. 
54
 Defining the taxpayer for purposes of the GUGIT is likely to require analysis of the group members’ community 
of interests.  See discussion in part 3.B. infra. 
55
 Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing:  A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-Income Countries or an 
Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L. J. 505 (2009) (arguing that tax sparing treaty provisions do not 
work efficiently and give rise to abuse). 
56
 The EP tends to view the next logical step harmonization of tax rates.  See the further study recommendations of 
the EP action, supra note 38, Amendment 37 and the rapporteur’s Explanatory Statement to accompany the EP 
enactment. 
57
 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 8, (reporting on the features of harmful tax competition).  
OECD Bureau of Fiscal Affairs, Towards Global Tax Co-operation, REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 
MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND 
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By limiting the value of subsidies through the tax system, the common tax base 
encourages jurisdictions to return to and increase use of transparent, direct subsidies.  Public 
scrutiny of those direct subsidies brings the additional benefit of discouraging economically 
inefficient subsidies like those that the United States commonly has delivered through its income 
tax system.
58
  
 
For most taxpayers, the GUGIT would change little from today.  Although the rules of 
inclusion might differ from current rules, the bulk of taxpayers in any country do not engage in 
any cross-border activity or investing.  Those taxpayers would report their incomes in much the 
same manner as they do today.  For remaining taxpayers who or which engage in transactions or 
invest across national borders, the GUGIT diminishes compliance costs by requiring familiarity 
with and reporting under a single set of rules.
59
  The compliance cost savings ameliorates 
somewhat the negative cost that loss of flexibility in tax planning would entail, as might the 
diminution of deadweight loss accompanying reduced diversion of resources from business 
activity to tax planning and inefficient, but tax-advantaged, investment.
60
   
 
Part 2.  Centralization, Sovereignty, and Privacy.  The GUGIT would have centralized 
reporting and auditing.  This central global taxing authority just may be the most utopian of the 
GUGIT visions.
61
  The agency responsible for enforcement would be transnational.  Each 
country would participate in the selection of the executives of the agency and assigning revenue 
                                                                                                                                                             
ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 16-26 (2000) (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf) (identifying uncooperative tax haven jurisdictions and reporting 
on progress toward cooperation).  Since 2009, the OECD no longer lists any country as an uncooperative tax haven.  
OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, List of Unco-operative Tax Havens (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.html, last visited June 27, 2012). 
58
 I.R.C. §103, for example (exempting interest on state and local bonds).  Marketing of tax exempt bonds often 
requires an interest rate greater than that which would attract the highest tax rate investors as bond purchasers.  
Since the rate is uniform on all bonds in an issue, the highest tax rate investor captures a higher than necessary rate 
when he purchases those bonds that have to be marketable to investors taxable at a lower rate thereby redirecting 
part of the subsidy intended to benefit the state or local governmental unit to the high rate investor.  
59
 The EC estimated a 7 percent reduction in compliance costs for multi-national enterprises that selected the 
CCCTB.  CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, at 5. 
60
 David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes:  Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S.CAL. L. REV. 
1339, 1349 (2000) observing: “[i]f the taxsavings is less than the cost of changing behavior (“standard deadweight 
loss”) and paying experts (“avoidance costs”), (footnote omitted) the issuer will use the more tax expensive form.”  
And Klaus-Dieter Drüen, Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung (Entrepreneurial Freedom and Tax Avoidance 
(author’s translation)) 158, 2d column, STUW 2/2008, observes:  “ … Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich 
betrachtet den Wett bewerb und führt zur ineffizienten Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in 
Unternehmen, Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung gebunden wird.” (citations 
omitted)  (“from an economic perspective, tax avoidance disrupts competition and leads to inefficient allocation of 
resources as considerable personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state is remains far from economic 
production maximization activity.) (author’s translation). 
61
 The agency would be gargantuan.  At the end of 2011, the IRS had approximately 93,000 employees.  INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2011 at 67.  If the central taxing agency were the exclusive agency and employee 
numbers were to increase in proportion to the increase in the gross domestic product of the area administered, the 
agency would need perhaps one-half million employees.  The US GDP in 2011 was approximately $15 trillion, 
while world GDP was approximately $75 trillion.  Central Intelligence Agency, THE WORLD FACT BOOK (updated 
weekly online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html. 
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agents at all levels of the agency.  The agency would have the authority to require both taxpayers 
and third parties to report information under uniform international standards.  The GUGIT 
legislation similarly would require local courts to support the taxing authority’s demand for 
information.   
 
Most, possibly all, taxpayers would submit their tax data electronically under uniform 
electronic forms.  The creation of identical forms in hundreds of languages is in and of itself a 
formidable task, but it is a task no different from that confronting current international bodies.
62
  
Information submission would include data necessary to enable the central authority to distribute 
the taxpayer’s income among the jurisdictions that would share the taxpayer’s tax base.   
 
Comprehensive third party information reporting and robust data matching would provide 
much of the information that the centralized agency would need to determine the tax base.  
Ideally, third parties would withhold and deposit part of any payment with the international tax 
agency.  Where the nature of the income production activity is inconvenient for or precludes 
withholding, the taxpayer would have to make periodic estimated tax payments.  The agency 
would retain the deposited funds in the currency deposited, but the taxpayer would have the 
minimal control over the funds to convert them into the taxpayer’s currency of choice.63  With 
extensive withholding, national tax authorities would determine the amount of tax payable in 
their respective jurisdictions and recover all or part of the tax from withheld funds and estimated 
tax deposits.  Withheld funds and estimated deposits are likely to be available to meet most tax 
obligations in the currency of the country requiring payment.  Each country imposing a tax 
would receive payments from the taxpayer’s withheld funds and estimated deposits first before 
looking to the taxpayer for payment.   
 
Enhanced withholding and information reporting to facilitate the GUGIT may eliminate 
the need for many, perhaps most, taxpayers to self-report at all.  Withholding and information 
reporting from third parties would provide both the information to determine the taxpayer’s tax 
liability and the funds with which to pay the taxpayer’s tax liability.64  Except in rare 
circumstances in which, for example, the taxpayer might claim non-income production related 
deductions other than a standard deduction, there would be little need to involve the taxpayer in 
that process.
65
   
 
An organization sufficiently vast to administer taxation worldwide is likely to become 
unwieldy.  Reliance on automated, non-discretionary operations with centralized data processing 
limits the need for discretionary administrative interventions that are the most cumbersome 
aspect of tax administration.  Like any large administrative body, local or regional offices would 
                                                 
62
 See discussion in part 3.D. infra. 
63
 A GUGIT is likely to stabilize currency conversion in many instances.  See discussion in part 3.D. infra. 
64
 In fact, the United States may be the outlier in requiring its taxpaying public to file returns of their income and 
assess their own tax.  Many jurisdictions, Germany for example, require self-reporting and payment only from those 
taxpayers who receive substantial amounts of income from sources other than their salaries.  Roman Seer, 
BESTEUERUNGSVERFAHREN :  RECHTSVERGLEICH USA-DEUTSCHLAND (Heidelberg 2002) (recommending self-
assessment for Germany).   
65
 Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, Return Free Filing  III-5-1 (2008) (using 
withholding and information reporting to eliminate filing for most taxpayers). 
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have to carry out most day to day functions of tax administration that require direct taxpayer 
contact or the exercise of discretion.  The challenge is enforcing worldwide uniformity and 
evenhandedness in tax administration.  While the taxing authority would have to deal with 
taxpayers in their own languages so that local administration is essential to operating efficiency, 
preventing taxpayers from “gaming the system” by choosing one specific national taxing 
authority over others is indispensable to building public confidence.
 66
  Underlying the EU’s 
CCCTB is an implicit assumption that neither favoritism nor corruption is problematic in any EU 
member state.  There the taxpayer continues to file and communicate primarily with its national 
taxing authority, and the local authority shares the information with the other jurisdictions in 
which the taxpayer operates.
67
  A global base does not lend itself as readily to similar no 
favoritism, no corruption assumptions.  Since the perception of even-handed treatment of all 
taxpayers under a central and apolitical taxing authority encourages tax compliance, oversight 
centralization is a key feature of the GUGIT.  In order to protect its legitimacy as an independent 
and multi-national administrative agency, it must manage interpretations and applications of 
rules as uniformly and impartially as the rules themselves.  Centralization and independence of 
the agency controls the risk of local favoritism and corruption and overcomes the negative public 
perception that local authorities might favor local residents in application of the tax laws.  
 
A functional central agency also must have the power to assemble tax information and 
coerce compliance without regard to national borders.  Nations must be willing to cede their 
national sovereignty to instill the necessary administrative and enforcement powers in the agency 
and provide policing support of the agency’s tax assessment and collection.  While 
relinquishment of sovereignty historically has been a matter of coercion through military 
conquest, following World War II, limited surrenders of sovereignty for the purposes of 
maintaining peaceful relations and supporting trade and economic development across borders 
has become commonplace.  Prime among those twentieth century compromises of national 
sovereignty is the formation of the EU
68
 in which the member states yielded autonomy, subject 
to the principles of subsidiarity
69
 and proportionality,
70
 in order to preserve peace in a region and 
capture the economic advantages of a common market for goods and services.
71
  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
66
 Local favoritism is a longstanding concern in the U.S.  The effort to control favoritism underlies the 
constitutionally protected, diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.  U.S. Constitution Art III, Section 2. 
67
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Article 109 at 58 (tax return filing with the principal tax authority where the 
group parent is resident). 
68
 The Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf) created the European 
Economic Community that ultimately became the EU.  The Treaty of Rome emphasized the removal of trade 
barriers in order to stabilize the region. 
69
 “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall 
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”  Art. 5 3. of CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY 
ON EUROPEAN UNION, Official Journal of the European Union C 83/15 (30.3.2010) (available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF). 
70
 “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”  Id.    at Art. 5 4.  
71
 For the first half of the twentieth century and much of the preceding centuries, one or another war plagued the 
European region and alliances constantly shifted.  Despite the temporary loss of national sovereignty twice in the 
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sovereignty often has proven a barrier to the creation of effective international agencies
72
 even 
though proliferation of international decision-making agencies acknowledges an ever increasing 
need for those bodies.
73
  Even the international agreement that introduced the common Euro 
currency in the EU protected national sovereignty on budgetary matters.
74
  That protection of 
sovereignty probably has contributed to the difficulties that the common currency is having in 
2012-13
75
 and could result in the ultimate collapse of the currency union.
76
   
 
Yielding sovereignty on tax matters may be easier than on matters of international 
borders, human rights, wealth distribution, control of the military,
77
 and prevention of war.  Tax 
collection is indispensable to maintenance of governmental functions and the preservation of 
existing power concentrations.  Technology and economic globalization has rendered it easier for 
taxpayers to shift revenue away from their home jurisdictions to diminish their tax burdens by 
way of transfer prices, by investments through bank secrecy jurisdictions using trusts, 
foundations, or local corporate entities, and by expatriation.  Increased international cooperation 
on tax matters becomes increasingly important to protecting the tax base.  Shortcomings in the 
effectiveness of international cooperation provide impetus for a GUGIT.  Thus, while the EC’s 
recent proposal on a CCCTB treads lightly on the issue of sovereignty,
78
 the EP’s election to 
make the CCCTB mandatory is more realistic in its recognition that only mandatory tax 
harmonization will generate the needed predictability and commonality of taxation within the EU 
                                                                                                                                                             
twentieth century to Germany, member states submitted voluntarily to Germany’s economic hegemony in order to 
build that market. 
72
 The United Nations, for example, suffers from insufficient power to enforce actions of its body although 
“peacekeeping troops” under U.N. control do serve an important function in maintaining separation of hostile 
nations.  The UN’s primary authority comes in the form of unenforceable resolutions and agreements to cooperate 
voluntarily in matters such as Iran sanctions. 
73
 In addition to the UN, there are regional organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, worldwide financial organizations 
including the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Trade Association, and tribunals including the International Court of Justice and the International 
Court of Human Rights, all of which exercise governmental-like functions across national borders. 
74
 Supra, note 7.  For links to the various texts making up the The Stability and Growth Pact, see the EC’s website 
for the legal texts at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/legal_texts/index_en.htm.   
And see the more recent conclusions of the EC on maintaining growth and stability in the EU and protecting the 
Euro, EC, Conclusions – 28/29 June 2012 available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf. 
75
 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, Mounting Risks, Euro Area Worries Fuel 
Financial Instability (October 10, 2012) (available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/new100912a.htm). 
76
 Greece and Spain have called on the European Central Bank for assistance with their national debt.  In Greece, 
serious political discussion of possible withdrawal from the euro currency and return to the Drachma ensued, but 
elections resulted in Greece’s decision to remain in the currency union.  See Rachel Donadio, Greek Voters Choose 
Party Supporting Bailout, NEW YORK TIMES A1 (June 18, 2012).  
77
 With some regularity, nations even put their troops under the control of foreign military commanders through 
various alliances including NATO and UN peacekeeping missions. 
78
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Explanatory Memorandum, Part 3 at 9-10 (addressing subsidiarity and 
proportionality in the context of voluntary participation in the CCCTB).  
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and prevent taxpayers from choosing the CCCTB when it is beneficial to them but rejecting it 
when it is not.
79
 
 
Since the OECD issued its initial report on harmful tax competition,
80
 there has been 
considerable and steady progress toward global tax information transparency.
81
  The Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum) 
currently has 118 member jurisdictions,
82
 including bank privacy jurisdictions such as 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein,
83
 and Luxembourg, plus the EU and nine observers.
 84
  Among the 
observers are international fiscal institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the Asian Development Bank, but the United Nations also is an observer.  The Global 
Forum has conducted more than 79 peer reviews of various jurisdictions for transparency and 
exchange of tax information.
85
  The reviews have multiple stages.  The 2012 report describes the 
review process: 
 
The peer review process examines the legal and regulatory framework of member 
jurisdictions (Phase 1 reviews) and the actual implementation of the international 
standard of transparency and exchange of information in practice (Phase 2 
reviews).  The review outputs include determinations regarding the availability of 
any relevant information in tax matters (ownership, accounting or bank 
information), the appropriate power of the administration to access the 
information and the administration’s capacity to deliver this information to any 
partner which requests it.
86
  
 
Underlying the progress report is an assumption that tax transparency and exchange of 
information has become an internationally accepted objective.  Members of the Global Forum 
strive to overcome internal barriers to transparency and exchange of information but no longer 
view transparency and exchange of information to be unacceptable compromise of national 
sovereignty.  Needless to say, implementation of information sharing lags well behind execution 
of information sharing and transparency agreements.
87
  A recent (and politically charged report) 
                                                 
79
 EP, Legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), supra note 38. 
80
 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 8. 
81
 Or, from the information sharing opponents’ perspective, considerable erosion of their privacy.   
82
 OECD, The Global Forum on Tax Transparency welcomes Romania as new member (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/theglobalforumontaxtransparencywelcomesromaniaasnewmember.htm). 
83
 See, for example, Larry R. Kemm, William M. Sharp Sr., and William T. Harrison III, Liechtenstein and the U.S.: 
The Long Road to Full Disclosure, 67 TAX NOTES INT'L 355 (July 23, 2012) (discussing the TIEA between 
Liechtenstein and the U.S. and the change in Liechtenstein law expanding the scope of information available under 
TIEAs) 
84
 Global Forum Progress Report, supra note 39, at 2 (at page 4, the report uses the number 108).  The list of 
members appears in Annex III to the report at 25-6.  
85
 Id.    
86
 Id.    at 2.  The report further refers to ten criteria of transparency and information exchange and lists them in 
Annex IV. at 27. 
87
 Global Forum Progress Report, supra note 17, at 19-24 (Annex II especially column C5 assessing timeliness of 
exchange of information).  Annex II displays in columnar form the results of the phase 1 assessments of 
transparency and exchange of information.  The report does not display the results of the phase 2 implementation 
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pegs the amount of net financial assets that wealthy individuals secrete in tax havens at 21 to 32 
trillion dollars, yielding a loss in tax revenue of 190 to 280 billion dollars each year.
88
  
 
Tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) allow the taxing authorities in one 
country to access information that another country has collected or has the power to collect in the 
administration of its domestic tax laws.
89
  Information exchange agreements generally govern 
information concerning taxpayers and transactions that may impact the assessment and collection 
of taxes in second country but to which the second country lacks direct access.
90
  Need for the 
exchange may be a matter of a taxpayer failing to report information to a second country when 
the taxpayer is obliged to do so or may stem from the lack of the second country’s jurisdiction 
over the record-keeper.   
 
Sometimes the existence of a TIEA may make the task of securing taxpayer cooperation 
on disclosing financial and related information more difficult.  Whenever one country may 
transfer information that individuals or entities must provide to another country, taxpayers and 
third party record-keepers raise concerns as to whether or not the requesting country will protect 
confidential information it receives through the exchange.
 91
  Those concerns in some instances 
may be valid and the OECD model agreements seek to guarantee confidentiality of 
information.
92
  However, concerns also may stem from the taxpayers having sought to avoid or 
evade taxes in the country that is requesting the information.  For those reasons, taxpayers may 
resist providing information voluntarily that they might have provided to the country having 
direct access to the taxpayer and record-keepers if the information were not subject to sharing.  
Practical concerns like those aside, national law has begun to yield to international law and 
treaties to give taxing agencies from one country authority to reach into another country for tax 
information.  A country under appropriate TIEAs may collect information concerning its own 
residents and citizens and businesses having their base in that country with respect to financial 
and tax information from operations and activities in the country into which it is reaching.  Many 
information exchange conventions require taxpayers to make information about themselves and 
third parties with whom they deal available to the foreign government’s agencies.  Yielding 
sovereignty becomes increasingly commonplace in the tax realm as information exchange 
                                                                                                                                                             
review but does observe that:  “[t]he main finding so far in several cases has been that information exchange is too 
slow and jurisdictions need to take steps to expedite the process.”  Id.    at 15. 
88
 William Hoffman, World's Wealthy Hide More Than $20 Trillion in Offshore Havens, Study Says, 2012 TNT 
142-5 (describing a report that the Tax Justice Network released).  The report is:  James S. Henry, The Price of 
Offshore Revisited:  New Estimates for “Missing” Global Private Wealth, Income, Inequality, and Lost Taxes 5 
(2012) (available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf) 
(estimating $21-35 trillion in hidden private wealth). 
89
 In 2002, the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of Information developed bilateral and 
multilateral variants for a model TIEA to combat harmful tax competition by making it more difficult for taxpayers 
to hide assets and transactions in low tax jurisdictions.  The model, Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters, is available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf. 
90
 Id.     
91
 The U.S. provides statutory protection of taxpayer information under I.R.C. §6103 prohibiting disclosure of 
returns and return information.  I.R.C. §6103 has an exception for disclosure of information for tax administration 
purposes, including “the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and 
application … tax conventions to which the United States is a party…”  I.R.C. §6103(b)(4)(A)(i).  I.R.C. 
§6103(k)(4) (permitting disclosure to foreign competent authority pursuant to treaty or convention). 
92
 Article 8 of the OECD model, supra note 89, protects the confidentiality of the exchanged information. 
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agreements proliferate.
93
  Many countries have come to accept that sound international tax 
administration demands the relinquishment of sovereignty.   
 
Given growing acceptance of transnational information sharing, it becomes easier to 
envision a GUGIT that a central and international authority administers.  With a GUGIT, 
taxpayers’ concerns about differing rules protecting confidential information become less cogent.  
Confidentiality protection rules are uniform throughout the GUGIT area.  A central authority 
renders most historical competent authority functions obsolete and, accordingly, limits inquiry 
on matters that are internal to an enterprise, such as transfer pricing, since the GUGIT distributes 
the uniform tax base among the countries in which the taxpayer produces income.  Risk of 
exposure of trade secrets often accompanies inquiry into the construction of the taxpayer’s 
transfer price within an enterprise group.  Taxpayers may continue to worry that enforcement of 
privacy protection will not be uniform, but the taxing authority’s vital independence from the 
control of national governments ultimately should dispel those worries -- although not 
necessarily taxpayers’ claims of concern.   
 
Extensive third party reporting of information is an indispensable supporting pillar of a 
GUGIT.  It simplifies data collection and verification.  The arms’ length relationship between the 
information provider and the taxpayer diminishes the likelihood of deception insofar as the third 
party has no incentive to risk civil and criminal penalties in order to protect an unrelated person’s 
tax information.  Certainly, the taxpayer could compensate the third party for withholding or 
falsifying information.  Historically, tax professionals and financial institutions readily accepted 
compensation to withhold or even falsify information for taxpayers,
94
 but in light of broad based 
information reporting that must accompany the GUGIT, the risk of detection because yet another 
party must report the same transaction might deter such practices.   
 
The GUGIT agency will have to overcome collateral concerns relating to personal 
privacy and protection of individual liberty.  Between a taxpayer and the national tax collector, 
no country protects the individual’s privacy.  The tax collector has the authority to access all the 
taxpayer’s business and personal records that relate in any way to the determination and 
assessment of tax.  The taxpayer only has the right to protection from dissemination of private 
information beyond the tax collection agency and outside the scope of tax collection.  The 
success of a GUGIT depends upon international recognition that the central taxing authority 
simply steps into the shoes and assumes all the authority of domestic taxing agencies.  While it 
may be difficult to accept a foreigner asking questions about one’s personal finances, most 
                                                 
93
 From 2008 through 2011, more than 800 TIEAs and dual tax conventions were signed.  Each of those agreements 
requires some surrender of a nation’s sovereign control over financial information of its residents or institutions and 
some level of international cooperation on tax reporting and collection.  OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Progress Report to the G20, supra note 39. 
94
 Consider the role of professional advisors in tax shelter design, Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 
18 at 87-94, and the recent criminal conviction of tax shelter attorney Paul Daugerdas and others, Dept of Justice, 
Office of Public Affairs, Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorneys, Former BDO Seidman CEO and Deutsche Bank Broker 
Found Guilty in New York of Multi-Billion Dollar Criminal Tax Fraud Scheme (May 24, 2011) (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-tax-676.html).  Daugerdas and Denis Field, however, have a new trial 
pending, while Donna Guerin pleaded guilty and will not have a new trial.  Basil Katz, Ex-lawyer pleads guilty in 
tax case, avoids new trial (9/14/12) (available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-
_September/Ex-lawyer_pleads_guilty_in_tax_case,_avoids_new_trial/). 
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 18 
 
people readily relinquish information in order to cross national borders or engage in business 
activities outside their home countries.  Athletes and entertainers frequently must address claims 
of foreign taxing authorities against a portion of their earnings.  For those who do not cross 
national borders, or do so only for the purposes of tourism, their tax reporting and information 
disclosures will not differ significantly from what they do now.  The agency to which they report 
may be different, but no country, other than their country of residence, will claim any portion of 
their taxes.  Their personal information will be no more vulnerable than it is today.  In fact, 
privacy protection is likely to be more vigilant under the GUGIT because the very size of the 
taxing authority makes security a primary structural concern. 
 
Part 3.  Some Technical Details of a GUGIT.  A successful GUGIT design
95
 will limit 
opportunities for taxpayers to diminish their taxes through transaction structures that lack a 
compelling non-tax purpose.  should be a matter of Economically sound choices independent of 
tax avoidance should determine business and investment decisions.
96
  The tax base involves at 
least four discrete design areas that the GUGIT project must and this article will address:  A) the 
formula for distributing the tax base among jurisdictions in which the taxpayer is active, B) the 
definition of the taxpayer for purposes of the GUGIT, C) expatriation prevention, and D) 
language and currency translation.  Part 4 addresses components of the base, including matters of 
accounting and specific inclusionary and exclusion rules.  
 
A. The distribution formula.  The CCCTB Proposal apportions business income 
among the jurisdictions in which the taxpayer is active according to a formula that gives equal 
weight to the three components of labor, property, and sales.
97
  The EP CCCTB resolution would 
decrease the sales factor to ten percent and increase each of the other factors to forty-five 
percent.
98
  Although the states of the United States use a combination of the property, payroll, 
and sales factors to apportion the income of corporations operating in more than one state, the 
states have not agreed on a single formula.
99
  Some states use only destination sales.
100
  In the 
course of collecting comments on the project, several commentators recommended to the 
CCCTB WG that destination sales should be the only factor because it is the most difficult factor 
to move from one taxing jurisdiction to another without the move impacting the profitability of 
                                                 
95
 Building consensus for a GUGIT will require long term gradual development that will include opportunities for all 
interested parties to participate.  At best, this paper provides a point of departure for the discussion and does not 
aspire to completeness.   
96
 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 18 at 70-72.-The CCCTB WG recognized the continuing risk of 
tax avoidance in the CCCTB and included an anti-avoidance rule in the proposal.  CCCTB Proposal Article 80, 
supra note 37 at 46. 
97
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Art 86 at 49.   
98
 Supra, note 38.   
99
 While Article IV of the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), Multistate Tax Compact (available on MTC’s 
website at http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=86) uses an equally weighted three factor formula like that of the 
CCCTB Proposal.  Only 18 states have adopted the Compact.  MTC, Member States (available at 
http://www.mtc.gov/AboutStateMap.aspx).  Other states use a variety of formulae, including 13 states that use only 
sales, some transitioning to only sales, other double or triple weighting of the sales factor.  See, Federation of Tax 
Administrators, State Apportionment of Corporate Income, (Formulas for tax year 2012 -- as of January 1, 2012) 
(available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/apport.pdf). 
100
 Id.    
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the taxpayer negatively.
101
  In any event, support for formulary apportionment for multi-national 
corporations’ international income is growing but not yet solid,102 and the apportionment formula 
is likely to include destination sales, property, and payroll. 
 
  1.  The Sales Factor.  Sales might be a reasonable choice as a single factor where 
the taxpayer is active only in countries having substantially equal tax rates and having 
populations with substantially equal abilities to consume.  The EU might be just such a region, 
but, even there, significant differences in wage levels and the ability to consume inhere.  The EP 
rapporteur attempted to “reconcile the various points of view about the factor “turnover,”103 by 
reducing the weighting of sales and increasing the weighting of the other factors.
104
  In the 
presence of large wealth disparities from country to country or region to region, destination sales 
is a far less compelling factor.   
 
The sales factor apportions income to consuming countries even when production is in 
non-consuming countries.  While it is difficult to manipulate the destination of sales without 
sacrificing profit, concentration of sales in wealthier jurisdictions deprives producing, but not 
consuming jurisdictions, of their shares of the tax base. 
 
  2.  The Property Factor.  Taxpayers locate their physical property where 
production or management activity takes place.  Heavy industry, both manufacturing and 
extraction, use substantial amounts of physical property.  While location of productive activity 
generally correlates with location of physical property, so that some labor-based measure of 
productive activity might substitute for that property in an apportionment formula, direct 
inclusion of a property factor in the apportionment formula seems appropriate.   
 
Moreover, form of ownership should make no difference to formulary inclusion.  Leased 
property should be part of the apportionment formula of the lessee during the term of its use of 
the property.  While the payment of business rent would be a deductible expense under the 
GUGIT, the present value of the rental payments should constitute property for purposes of the 
allocation formula.  The independence of the lessor from the lessee assures that the rental price 
reflects fair market rental value.  Where the lessor and lessee are not dealing at arms’ length, the 
GUGIT would disregard the lease and include the owned property as property of the taxpaying 
enterprise that includes both the lessor and the lessee.  The property factor will apportion income 
to the location of the productive activity, whether the productive activity is the actual 
manufacturing or extraction or, in the case of management offices, the management of activity 
occurs. 
                                                 
101
 Reuven S.Avi Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits, supra note 3, 
(relinquishing sales opportunities in order to move income to another jurisdiction hardly makes economic sense). 
102
 Eric Kroh, Formulary Apportionment Could Resolve Problems With International Taxation System, Tax Notes 
Today (July 20, 2012) (available at http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/tnt3.nsf/%28Number/2012+TNT+139-
3?OpenDocument&Login) (summarizing comments Lee Shepard of Tax Analysts and Paul Oosterhuis of Skadden, 
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP concerning formulary apportionment at an International Tax Institute forum).  
103
 EP CCCTB resolutions, supra note 38.   
104
 Id.  Part of the objection lay in the universal presence in the EU of a destination sales based value added tax, so 
the proposed formula would give significant weight to sales under both primary tax systems in the EU, the income 
tax and the value added tax.. 
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 To the contrary, the location of intangible property frequently bears little relationship to 
productive activity.  Excluding intangible property from the apportionment formula prevents 
enterprises that generate income from intangible property from shifting the income artificially to 
lower tax jurisdictions.  One may store the formula for a process or a pharmaceutical anywhere 
without adversely affecting the production from use of the intangible elsewhere.  The CCCTB 
Proposal excludes intangible assets from the property factor of the apportionment formula 
because relocation of those assets requires no significant cost.
105
   
 
Since the creation of the intangible property will manifest itself in the payroll factor 
during its creation and development and in the sales factor as it generates saleable goods or 
services, the GUGIT apportionment formula should disregard intangible property completely.  
Location of intangible intellectual property has been central to the aggressive use of transfer 
pricing to shift income to low tax jurisdictions. 
106
   Similarly, other intangible property like 
goodwill follows the location of the enterprise headquarters and management.  Several major 
corporations moved their nominal headquarters outside the United States
107
 in order to avoid the 
United States residual tax on income from lower tax jurisdictions.
108
  The costs associated with 
the headquarters’ move generally were not significant and did not require top management to 
relocate to that jurisdiction.  Those costs increased materially when the United States began to 
impose a continuing tax on the income of expatriate corporations.
109
  Disregarding intangibles in 
the property factor of the apportionment formula eliminates major complexities of the income 
tax and removes a principal incentive to establishing a presence in low tax jurisdictions to 
receive and own intellectual property and other intangible property.   
 
  3.  The Payroll Factor.  Outsourcing, whether contractual or by shifting one’s own 
operations to a low wage and low cost jurisdiction, became common in the last decades of the 
twentieth century.  Costs, not taxes, generally drove decisions to shift manufacturing, call 
centers, and other operations to those low cost jurisdictions, but one could envision taxes under 
an apportionment formula providing sufficient additional incentive to managers to relocate 
operations but not top management.
110
  A payroll factor that only takes gross wages (and, 
                                                 
105
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Article 92 1. at 51. 
106
 Intangibles have proven to be particularly problematic from a transfer pricing perspective.  OECD, Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, supra note 25. 
107
 The literature refers to the transaction as a corporate inversion.  See, for example, Rachelle Y. Holmes, 
Deconstructing Corporate Tax, 25 AKRON TAX J. 1, 17-18 (discussing the reasons for corporate inversions). 
108
 The inversion trend arose in part from the U.S.’s worldwide taxation of its citizens, permanent residents, and 
domestic corporations.  The U.S. cedes primary taxing jurisdiction to the country in which the taxpayer earns 
income by giving the taxpayer a credit against the U.S. tax on that foreign income (but not exceeding the amount the 
U.S. tax would be on that income).  I.R.C. §901 (providing a tax credit for foreign taxes paid); I.R.C. §164(a) (3) 
(allowing a deduction for foreign taxes if the taxpayer does not elect a credit).  Thus, a person subject to U.S. 
worldwide taxing jurisdictions pays tax at a combined rate no lower than the U.S. rate.  
109
 I.R.C. §7874 (imposing a tax on the income of a corporation that expatriates as if it continued to be a domestic 
corporation and taxing certain controlled expatriated corporations as domestic corporations).  A number of countries 
that have a territorial system of taxation continue to impose a tax on the investment incomes of expatriates for a 
period as much as 10 years following expatriation.  Inkomstskattlag (1999:1229) 3. Kap. 19 § (Income Tax Law of 
Sweden 3. Chap. 19§) (taxing Swedish citizens and permanent residents who leave Sweden on income from capital). 
110
 Kroh, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 102, (summarizing Oosterhuis’ objections to formulary 
apportionment). 
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presumably, also payments to independent contractors into account) may slant the weight of the 
factor to high wage jurisdictions where highly compensated managers are located or, in the case 
of development of intellectual property, including drugs, for example, the research and 
experimentation takes place.
111
  The CCCTB WG was mindful of wage differentials from 
country to country and tried to address the disparities by dividing the labor factor in its formula 
into two equally weighted components:  payroll and number of employees.
112
  Rather than 
balancing wage differentials with an employee numbers feature, the formula could employ a cost 
of living or wage differential factor to adjust wages to a common value for purposes of applying 
the distribution formula.  Alternatively, the formula could measure part of the payroll factor by 
taking person hours of work into account rather than a simple count of the number of employees 
since longer hours for low wages may characterize the working conditions in those outsourcing 
target jurisdictions.   
 
 4.  The Beneficial Ownership Factor.  While none of the existing apportionment 
formulae take underlying ownership into account, increasingly tax administrators probe 
beneficial ownership of entities in bank secrecy jurisdictions in order to determine whether 
taxpayers are concealing income on which they are subject to tax in the investigating 
jurisdiction.  The United States long has required its taxpayers to report their investment 
accounts outside the United States.  More recently, the IRS has begun to demand extensive 
information on beneficial ownership of accounts in Switzerland.  Tax administrators in Germany 
and elsewhere in Europe purchased stolen secret bank records in order to identify German 
taxpayers who were using Liechtenstein foundations to avoid or evade taxes in Germany.
113
  The 
United States enacted legislation designed to ferret out additional information in order to tax 
United States citizens and residents on their offshore investment activities.
114
   
 
With growing emphasis on beneficial ownership to prevent taxpayers from concealing 
assets and income,
115
 declining corporate tax rates, integration of corporate and shareholder 
taxes, and the increasing use of tax transparent entities,
116
 including a beneficial ownership factor 
in the apportionment formula would make sense.  An entity’s income inures directly through 
distributions and indirectly by way of capital appreciation to the entity’s owners.  Opponents of 
                                                 
111
 Short of intermediary entities such as personal service corporations established in low tax jurisdictions to provide 
the services of their otherwise highly compensated owner/employees, the labor portion of the formula is 
predominantly residence based. 
112
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Art. 86 1 at 49.  
113
 Gerson Trüg und Jörg Habetha, Die “Liechtensteiner Steueraffäre – Strafverfolgung durch Begehung von 
Straftaten? (The Liechtenstein Tax Matter – Criminal Pursuit through Commission of Criminal Offenses?), NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 887 (2008) (describing the purchase of a CD rom with secret accountholder 
information for a price of some 4.2 million Euros). 
114
 Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of 2010 as part of the Hiring Incentives to 
Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, PL 111-147 (3/18/10) (requiring taxpayers to report foreign financial 
holdings and foreign financial institutions to identify U.S. taxpayers among their direct and indirect accountholders; 
imposing penalties for failure to comply with reporting requirements).   
115
 See, for example, OECD Model TIEA, supra note 89, Article 5 Exchange of Information on Request emphasizes 
in various places identification of beneficial rather than legal ownership as a criterion for exchange. 
116
 Partnerships (including limited liability companies in the United States) and limited partnerships, and trusts in 
common law jurisdictions generally are transparent so that the income of the entity is taxable to the owners of the 
entity and not to the entity itself.  
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the corporate income tax often characterize tax on corporate distributions following a tax on the 
corporate income as double taxation.  In identifying where income should be taxed, a beneficial 
ownership factor in the formula directs the income to where it provides its final economic 
benefit.   
 
One even might argue that income should be taxable only where the benefit accrues so 
that the single factor of beneficial ownership should be the only apportionment factor.  Applying 
a single factor beneficial ownership formula concentrates income in wealthy jurisdictions even if 
sales and production occur in less wealthy jurisdictions.  Accordingly, beneficial ownership of 
income (or the income producing entity) should be one of the several apportionment factors but 
probably should not be the only factor in the distribution formula.   
 
Requiring identification of the underlying ownership, subject to protection of the identity 
of the owners where they desire that protection, should not be a barrier to that apportionment 
factor.  Use of beneficial ownership as a factor also might lead to simplification of unnecessarily 
complex entity structures when the owners no longer may hide behind layers of entities.  
Moreover, technology for tracking changes in ownership is readily available to enable entities to 
identify actual ownership and changes in ownership on a daily basis.  The statutes would require 
beneficial ownership disclosure to the entity in order to enable it to comply with its statutory 
obligation to apply the apportionment formula.   
 
Supported by robust anti-avoidance provisions, apportionment of business income under 
a formula composed of sales, property, payroll, and beneficial ownership would strike a sound 
and fair balance for income distribution of enterprises.  Sales and beneficial ownership would 
tend, although not identically, to place income in wealthier consuming countries while property 
and payroll would apportion income to producing and manufacturing countries.  The bifurcated 
payroll factor of employee numbers, work hours, or adjusted wages for cost of living 
differentials would balance in part the high wages in the formula that favor top management in 
the wealthier countries.  Similarly, the property factor could use an adjustment factor to eliminate 
the distortion that very low and very high cost locations bring to the formula.  Investment 
(capital) income of operating enterprises would follow income from production under an 
assumption that investment return is a function of the underlying income production and 
accompanying retention and investment.   
 
For investment entities not part of a larger enterprise engaged in the active conduct of 
business, income should follow a single factor of beneficial ownership except where the 
investment is inextricably linked to specific countries.  Income from direct investment in real 
property, natural resources, and personal property used in a specific country and the investment 
return from a pooled investment vehicle that invests in such property
117
 probably should be 
taxable in the country of permanent location, extraction, or use. 
 
                                                 
117
 Especially if it is tax transparent like a REIT, for example. 
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  5.  Individuals.  To this point the discussion has focused on enterprises composed 
of any combination of entities (or a single entity) and individual sole proprietorships
118
 having 
property, payroll, sales of goods or services, or beneficial ownership in more than one 
jurisdiction.  A comprehensive GUGIT addresses taxation of individuals as well and 
contemplates a uniform set of rules that determine the tax base that includes income from 
individuals’ services and from their investments.  As noted above,119 while the GUGIT may alter 
specific rules of inclusion, exclusion, or deduction in the course of harmonizing those rules 
worldwide, the changes may appear no different from tax law changes that national legislatures 
make regularly.  The GUGIT will change little else for most individuals, as it will allocate 
income from services an individual performs in the single jurisdiction where the individual lives 
and works to that jurisdiction.  Similarly, investment income from domestic financial accounts 
and stocks will be taxable in the jurisdiction in which the individual lives and works.  Such 
individuals will continue to report income locally and deal with local tax offices if necessary.  In 
the presence of extensive third party information reporting and withholding,
120
 self-reporting and 
self-assessment will become obsolete.    
 
This section suggests several models for apportionment of income from services so that 
individuals, who work in more than one jurisdiction or work in a jurisdiction different from that 
in which they live, may find the GUGIT affecting them more profoundly.  One model, however, 
may require no major changes from the taxation of individuals under current double tax 
convention practice.  Consistent with the OECD’s Model Tax Convention,121 under many double 
taxation treaties, countries in which a nonresident works often cede the authority to tax income 
from services under the countries’ general income tax, but not under wage taxes for retirement 
and insurance programs,
122
 to the jurisdiction in which the individual resides.
123
  Exceptions to 
this cession of taxing power under the treaties exist for certain types of services, including 
                                                 
118
 The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Condensed Version) (2010) (available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-
capital-condensed-version-2010_mtc_cond-2010-en) (OECD Model Convention in the following) deleted Article 14 
Independent Personal Services in the year 2000 because of overlap with Article 7 Business Profits, so that Article 14 
was unnecessary.  Commentary on Article 14, id., at 250.  Independent personal services constitute a trade of 
business so that income from that trade or business is Article 7 Business Profits (allocating business profits to the 
residence jurisdiction unless the taxpayer produces the profits from a permanent establishment in the other country – 
subject to an embedded transfer pricing rule). 
119
 Text following note 58 supra. 
120
 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
121
 Supra note 118. 
122
 OECD Model Convention, supra note 118, Article 2 Taxes Covered.  Compare Article 2 of the Convention 
between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes (1989) 
(available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/germany.pdf ) (Germany – US Double Tax Treaty). 
123
 For example, see Article 7 Business Profits and Article 14 Independent Personal Services (repealed in the OECD 
Model Convention, supra note 118, favoring the jurisdiction of residence unless the taxpayer works from a fixed 
place in the other country) and Article 15 Dependent Personal Services (favoring the residence jurisdiction but 
permitting the other country to tax income from services performed there if the taxpayer is not present in her 
resident jurisdiction more than half the year) of the Germany – US Double Tax Treaty, supra note 122 .  Likewise, 
OECD Model Convention, supra note 118, Article 15 Dependent Personal Services at 31 (favoring resident 
jurisdiction unless taxpayer works in the other country and is not present in resident country more than half the 
year).   
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athletic and entertainment activities, which are taxable in both the resident country and the 
country in which the individual engages in the activity.
124
  Other than those exceptions, only 
when the individual does not live most of the year in her country of residence, do the treaties 
give the jurisdiction in which the individual performs services as an employee the authority to 
tax the individual’s wages.125  In those instances, jurisdictions with territorial tax systems cede 
the authority to tax the taxpayer’s income from personal services to the jurisdiction in which the 
individual performs services.
126
  And when the taxpayer performs services as an independent 
contractor and not an employee from a permanent establishment may the work location tax the 
service provider.
127
   
 
Under its global income taxation system,
128
 however, the United States continues to tax 
even if the individual properly becomes taxable on her wages in another country.  To prevent 
double taxation of the income, the United States applies any properly imposed foreign income 
taxes as a credit against the United States income tax otherwise payable.
129
  The income from 
services of a United States citizen or permanent resident will be subject to a tax rate lower than 
the United States’ tax rate on that income only when the individual qualifies for the limited 
exclusion for United States persons who live and work outside the United States.
130
  Otherwise 
the individual is taxable in the United States on the foreign earned income, and all United States 
individuals also are taxable on their foreign earned income in excess of the limitation.
131
  Foreign 
taxes payable on the income from services are creditable in the United States but not to the 
extent the foreign taxes exceed the United States income tax on that income.
132
   
 
The residence-based allocation rule of modern treaties has much to recommend it for the 
GUGIT.  The rule is simple to apply.  A residence rule enables most taxpayers to participate in a 
single country’s array of social welfare programs and retirement systems.  Choice of one’s place 
of residence under a more than half year rule would seem a sufficiently important personal 
decision that for most taxpayers the decision remains free from tax planning motivations.
133
  
Nevertheless, expatriation to avoid taxes remains a recurrent theme in the United States
134
 and 
                                                 
124
 Id.    Article 17. 
125
 Id.    Article 15. 
126
 Sweden, for example, exempts its citizens and residents from Swedish income tax if they reside and work outside 
Sweden for at least six months and are taxable on the personal services income in the other country, and, without 
regard to taxation in the country where they work if the period is at least one year.  Inkomstskattelag (Sweden), 
supra note 109, 3. Kap. 9 §. 
127
 OECD Model Convention, supra note 118, Article 7 Business Profits.  
128
 I.R.C. §61 (including in the individual’s gross income “all income from whatever source derived” without regard 
to where the individual earns the income). 
129
 I.R.C. §901. 
130
 I.R.C. §911 (excluding an inflation adjusted amount of income in the case of U.S. citizens who are bona fide 
foreign resident living outside the U.S. for the full tax year or U.S. citizens or residents residing outside the U.S. 330 
days in any 12 month period).  
131
 I.R.C. §61.  
132
 I.R.C. §901 (providing a credit for foreign taxes); I.R.C. §904 (limiting the credit under I.R.C. §901 to a 
proportional amount of the U.S. tax on the foreign income). 
133
 Compare, doctrine of acts of independent significance referring to acts that are unlikely to be within a taxpayer’s 
control or which the taxpayer is unlikely to engage in for tax avoidance purposes. 
134
 Marie Sapirie, Facebook Expat Is Latest Billionaire Without Borders, 2012 WTD 96-3 (discussing expatriation to 
avoid U.S. taxes).  For a list of 1
st
 quarter 2012 expatriates (including long term, non-citizens who relinquished 
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other countries and may require anti-avoidance rules to prevent taxpayers from changing primary 
residence without relinquishing the collateral characteristics of their previous residence.
135
   
 
Other configurations of the allocation rule might make expatriation less dependent upon 
an anti-avoidance rules and might distribute revenue more equitably among the states in which 
the taxpayer is active.  A residence-based rule also is problematic because it is likely to result in 
considerable mismatching of income and deduction whenever the service recipient is taxable in 
one country and the service provider taxable in another. 
 
Treaties recognize that for certain taxpayers the performance jurisdiction should have the 
right to tax the income.
136
  Determining how much of the taxpayer’s income is attributable to the 
place of performance may be no easy matter.  For example, an athlete may train in one country, 
perhaps the country of her residence, but receive payment for competing in another.  If the 
athlete would receive no payment without a successful outcome, place of performance arguably 
is the place of the competition only, even if the time the athlete spends there is small relative to 
the time in training.  On the other hand, without the training, the athlete would be unlikely to 
compete successfully so the income belongs primarily to the place of training.  An athlete who 
receives a salary from an employer based in the country where she trains but who competes in 
another country should be taxable in both.  Allocation might follow an absolute measure of time 
spent in each location, the measure of time that the athlete engages in the athletic activity in each 
jurisdiction, both training and competition, or perhaps heavier weighting of the time in 
competition in an allocation based on the proportional amount of weighted time she devotes to 
the athletic activity in each.
137
  The issues for entertainers are the same.  In both the case of the 
athlete and the entertainer, the individual is selling into and performing some part of her services 
in a jurisdiction in which she does not reside.  With or without a GUGIT, the issue of place of 
performance often is ambiguous.   
 
Even more perplexing is where to allocate the service income of an individual who 
performs services remotely from a fixed location for customers located in other jurisdictions.  By 
analogy to destination sales-based apportionment,
138
 it might be appropriate to tax the services 
where the customer receives delivery and consumes them rather than where the service provider 
performs them.  For example, a customer might commission an artist
139
 who lives and works in 
country A to create artwork for the customer’s office building in country B.  Simplifying the 
issue, assume the artist never enters country B, and the customer sends a representative to 
country A to collect the completed work and transport it to country B.  Should the result differ if 
                                                                                                                                                             
permanent residency) see Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Quarterly Publication of 
Individuals, Who Have Chosen To Expatriate, 77 F.R. 25538-44 (April 30, 2012). 
135
 See discussion infra in part 3.C. 
136
 OECD Model Convention, supra note 118, Article 17 Artistes and Sportsmen (allowing the country of 
performance to tax). 
137
 Compare OECD Model Convention, supra note 118, Commentary to Article 17 (not providing a method for 
determining what portion of the athlete’s or entertainer’s income is attributable to the place of performance).  
138
 See discussion supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
139
 Implicit in the commentary to Article 17 of the OECD Model Convention, supra note 118 at 271 is that the term 
“artiste” does not contemplate a sculptor or painter but may include a performance artist because of the performance 
element of the art. 
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 26 
 
the artist ships the completed work to customer in country B, or the artist makes a single trip to B 
in order to oversee the installation of the work?
140
  Remote performance of technology services 
is still more bewildering.  With technology services, a technician in country A, all of whose 
clients are in country B, may reach into country B through cyberspace in order to alter, create, 
repair, or destroy an item that the customer or target uses in country B or elsewhere and which 
may have no physical manifestation at all.  The data may be stored in country B or anywhere else 
in the world, including a satellite or under an arctic or Antarctic ice sheet.   
 
Yet, a residence rule that would allocate all a taxpayer’s service income to the single 
jurisdiction in which the taxpayer resides without regard to the identity of the employer or other 
payer is somewhat unsatisfying.  The rule might be better if, for a taxpayer who regularly splits 
her residence time between or among jurisdictions, the rule would allocate all income from 
services according to those relative periods of time.  Temporary presence and work in another 
jurisdiction for an aggregate period during the year that does not exceed a minimal period, ten 
days, for example, the rule would disregard.  For most taxpayers, the rule corresponds to their 
activities and simplifies reporting for them when they spend short periods in another jurisdiction.  
For the athletes and artists, in the example above, a special rule of allocation still might be 
necessary if the principal source of income for the taxpayer were a competition or two in a 
country where the taxpayer spends little time.  
 
A payer rule, on the other hand, would allocate the income to the country in which the 
payer takes the expenditure into account, whether by way of deduction or capitalization.  A payer 
rule is appealing because it avoids mismatching of income and deduction.  For each deduction, 
there is an inclusion in the same country.  A payer rule may provide the fewest opportunities for 
tax planning since the business decision that drives the employment places the payer and the 
recipient at arms’ length to one another.  A payer rule, however, may complicate reporting for 
the individual service provider and subject her to taxation in other countries even if she does not 
perform any services in those countries.
141
  While the mechanics of a single tax administrative 
agency may simplify the reporting, the outcome may seem unfair to a taxpayer who does not 
leave her residence jurisdiction to perform services but works for a foreign employer.  The 
taxpayer even may be unaware that the employer is foreign.
142
   
 
Finally, rather than a place of performance rule, a rule that allocates income based upon 
the intended impact of the performance of services would allocate income to the jurisdiction 
where the individual’s services have their impact.  While athletes might be taxable under that 
rule only where they compete and not where they train, in most cases their performance would 
carry recognition and intended impact through endorsements, for example, in their home country 
as well as the performance country.  Remote services are taxable not at the location of the 
                                                 
140
 The CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Article 96 at 52-3 (using destination sales as the sales factor but having 
alternative rules to deal with the complexity of the issue for goods and especially services).  On the other hand, for 
the labor factor in the apportionment formula, an employee is allocated to the member of the enterprise group from 
which the employee receives payment.  Id.   , Article 91 1. at 50. 
141
 Compare the CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Art. 91 1. at 50 (including employees in the labor factor of the 
group member from whom they receive compensation). 
142
 Id.  Art 91 2. (including employees in the labor factor of a group member for which they work if different from 
the payer). 
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taxpayer and but where those services have their intended impact.  Such an impact rule is also 
likely to allocate a larger proportional share of the income of highly compensated individuals to 
poorer countries where those individuals may be responsible for the business decisions 
concerning operations and activities in those countries including manufacturing and natural 
resource production.  This impact rule might distribute taxable income more fairly between rich 
and poor countries although a modified residence rule might accomplish the same end as top 
managers are likely to visit facilities in poorer countries regularly even if the managers are not 
based in those countries.  Problems of mismatching income and deduction might inhere under 
such a rule, but, in many cases, the distribution formula for business income would apportion 
more of the income to the producing countries so that the impact rule would match the income 
and deduction.  Undoubtedly, an impact rule would be at least somewhat unwieldy as place of 
impact is likely to be uncertain in many instances and in others services may have an intended 
impact in multiple jurisdictions.  
 
6.  Investment Income.  An individual’s income from investment raises questions 
different from her income from personal services.  Most investments do not have a place of 
performance and often do not present any risk of mismatching inclusion of income and deduction 
of payment in so far as investment gains, as opposed to periodic payments of interest, dividend, 
or royalty, give rise to no deduction.  Under current law, an individual taxpayer is taxable in her 
country of residence and on periodic payments frequently also is taxable in the country of the 
investment as well.
143
  Since the taxpayer may have no other contact with the investment 
jurisdiction, withholding taxes at the source of the payment of an investment return substitute for 
tax returns for the foreign investors.
144
  Treaties frequently reduce the rate or eliminate the 
withholding tax and cede the jurisdiction to tax to the investor’s home country.145  Subject to tax 
avoidance expatriation rules,
146
 countries with territorial income tax systems do not tax their 
citizens who live abroad on investment income even if they retain their citizenship.
147
  The 
United States differs in this respect as well by conditioning exemption from United States 
income taxes on relinquishment of citizenship.
148
 
 
Investment income in the case of an enterprise derives from the investment of retained 
revenue.  Apportioning the investment income in the same manner as the active income of the 
enterprise approximates attributing the investment income to the source of the funds for 
investment.  Investment income for individuals similarly might follow the allocation of the 
                                                 
143
 Art. 10 Dividends and Art. 11 Interest (taxable in country of residence but also by limited withholding tax in 
country of source), OECD Model Convention, supra, note 123, but not Art. 12 Royalties (taxable only in residence 
country unless from a permanent establishment in the source country). 
144
 I.R.C. §§871 and 881 (providing a withholding tax on periodic income on non-resident individuals and 
corporations respectively) are representative of withholding at the source. 
145
 U.S. – Germany Double Tax Convention, supra note 123, Article 10 (reducing the withholding rate on dividends 
from 30 percent (I.R.C. §871) to 5 or 15 percent), Articles 11 and 12 (empowering only the country of residence to 
tax interest and royalties respectively). 
146
 Sweden, for example, supra, note 109.  See part 3.C. infra. 
147
 Individuals resident in or having certain connections to and previously resident Sweden are taxable on their 
income from all sources in Sweden.  Inkomstskattelag (Sweden), supra note 109, 3. Kap. 3 §.  Non-residents, 
whether or not Swedish citizens, are taxable only on income from Swedish sources.  Id.     3. Kap. 18 §. 
148
 Treas. reg. § 1.1-1(a) (imposing “an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of 
the United States…).  I.R.C. §61 (including all income from whatever source derived in gross income).   
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individual’s personal service income as the source of funds for the individual to invest.  Such a 
rule is far less compelling for individuals than it is for enterprises.  After retirement, for example, 
the individual no longer would have service income to follow although the formula might take 
the individual’s lifelong work record or, in order to simplify the process, an average of some 
number of years of the individual’s work record into account and allocate investment income 
according to that determination.  That generalization, however, fails to account for the wealth 
many individuals inherit or receive as gifts.  To be consistent with the production rule for the 
investment income from that wealth, one would have to look to the donor’s work history rather 
than the donee’s whose taxes are at issue.  That might prove a formidable task over several 
generations of gifts.   
 
Principal residence-based allocation, subject to a few special rules for investments in 
tangible productive property
149
 having a direct geographical link to a specific country, including 
rental personal and real property, natural resource production, farming properties, might work 
more smoothly than allocation following service income.  It is a less appealing rule when an 
individual lives in one country but works in a neighboring country or when an individual stops 
working and moves to another country from that in which she worked, thereby depriving the 
country in which she earned her wealth of the tax on the income from the investment of that 
earned wealth.  In the latter case, investment income should be taxable in the jurisdiction of 
residence but subject to expatriation limitations.
150
  In the former instance, even though a portion 
or all the investment income results from investment of the income from the individual’s services 
in another jurisdiction, simplicity and adherence to existing prevailing rules should take 
precedence.  In any event, if the trend of preferential rates of tax on capital income continues, 
taxing investment income that is not part of a trade or business but primarily capital income may 
represent a smaller loss of revenue than loss of the tax on income from personal services. 
 
B. Enterprise and related taxpayer definitions.  Most income tax systems examine 
transactions between related taxpayers under various arms’ length pricing standards.  Rules that 
permit the tax collector to adjust the price for tax purposes between such taxpayers to an 
appropriate arms’ length price151 without regard to actual payment amounts152 recognize that 
taxpayers may not set their prices at arms’ length because of their close relationship.  Even when 
the price may be arms’ length, the allocation of asset ownership among members of a taxpayer’s 
interest group may shift income from that asset to low tax jurisdictions artificially.  Chief among 
the assets that taxpayers have used within a group to shift income has been intangible property, 
especially intellectual property.  By shifting ownership to a related entity in a low tax offshore 
jurisdiction, the domestic taxpayer that may own the offshore group member defers domestic 
taxes until they repatriate the income from the offshore group member in those jurisdictions that 
                                                 
149
 In many instances, the U.S. tax law might view such investments as income from the conduct of a trade or 
business as opposed to investment income.   
150
 See part 3.C. infra. 
151
 I.R.C. §482, for example (giving the IRS the power to redetermine prices in transactions between related 
taxpayers).   
152
 The tax collector may not require the taxpayers to change their actual prices but may require taxpayers to 
determine income and deduction based upon an adjusted price. 
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tax domestic persons on their worldwide income
153
 and may eliminate domestic taxation of the 
income where the jurisdiction only taxes domestic persons on their income from domestic 
sources and not on distributions from foreign group members. 
 
Even when pricing is correct, taxpayers may manipulate the timing of income or loss 
under a realization based tax system without relinquishing interest group control of the property.  
Statutory rules in the United States, for example, deter some timing shifts by denying losses on 
sales between related taxpayers.
154
  Under the GUGIT’s concept of taxpayer group, timing of 
inclusion and deduction would correspond in most instances with the group’s actual 
relinquishment of ownership or control of the asset sold. 
 
Essential to limiting taxpayers’ opportunities to shift income to low tax jurisdictions 
under the GUGIT is a robust mechanism that apportions a single tax base among taxpayers who 
or which act or tend to act in concert.  Determining which taxpayers are sufficiently closely 
related to share a common tax base informs two basic issues:  (i) income splitting to shift income 
to a taxpayer subject to a lower rate of tax in the same or another taxing jurisdiction and (ii) the 
privilege to use losses from one person to offset another person’s income.  While these issues 
frequently manifest themselves in enterprise groups, tax administrators have struggled with them 
in family settings as well.  For example, the United States Supreme Court determined that one 
spouse may not shift income from his personal services contractually to the other spouse even 
though the binding contractual obligation arose before the taxpayer performed the services and 
gave the other spouse the legal right to that income.
155
  The United States ultimately resolved the 
marital unit issue by permitting spouses to file a joint return of income.  The issue inheres for 
non-marital relationships.   
 
Despite the Court decisions barring direct shifting of income from services, opportunities 
to shift income indirectly abide.  A taxpayer may interpose an entity, including a tax transparent 
entity like a partnership, S corporation, or limited liability company, and perform services on 
behalf of the entity.  The service provider effectively shifts income to the entity in exchange for a 
smaller amount of compensation from the entity and shares the income with other owners who 
might be related to the service provider.  Taxpayers also may shift income from services by 
transforming their services into property.  Painters, composers, builders, for examples, shift 
income by giving the finished product to a family member who sells the product and includes the 
taxable income from the sale.  Tax rules often combat artificial shifts of income with anti-
                                                 
153
 The U.S., for example, see treas. reg. §1.1-1(a) (taxing resident and nonresident U.S. citizens on their worldwide 
incomes).  
154
 For example, I.R.C. §267 (disallowing the deduction of losses on sales of property between related taxpayers). 
155
 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding that a binding contract between spouses under which the working 
spouse assigns half his income from services to the other spouse does not prevent the working spouse from having to 
include the full amount of his service income for tax purposes).  However, if the assignment of income is by 
operation of law in a community property jurisdiction, the working spouse is taxed on only half the income.  Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).  Community property laws applicable to married individuals split income between 
spouses so that each spouse is entitled to one-half the income of the marital unit.  There is a considerable body of 
commentary on the interplay between the community property laws in California as applicable to those same sex 
couples who married before the California referendum ended same sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act’s 
rejection for federal purposes of same sex marriage. 
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avoidance rules.  In the United States, several statutes allow the IRS to reallocate income among 
related taxpayers to prevent tax avoidance.
156
   
 
Income splitting includes a wide-range of permutations.  As noted above,
157
 for enterprise 
groups, the problem in the international context takes the form of transfer pricing
158
 and 
placement of ownership of intangible assets in low tax countries.  If the related taxpayers 
together are a single taxpayer under a GUGIT, the GUGIT’s formula for distribution of the tax 
base disregards transactions between members of the single taxpayer group, so that the transfer 
price would be of no concern for tax purposes.  A major source of contention between taxpayers 
and their national tax collectors would disappear with transfer pricing.
159
  And the GUGIT 
apportions the group income without regard to the location of intangible assets, so that 
positioning those assets in low tax jurisdictions does not shift the income from those assets to 
that jurisdiction.
160
 
 
With respect to enterprise groups, the CCCTB Proposal identifies the taxpayer by means 
of dual test of ownership and voting control.  It requires ownership of more than fifty percent 
voting rights and more than seventy-five percent equity for consolidation.
161
  The United States 
always has used a much higher common ownership rule in permitting domestic corporations to 
become a single taxpayer.  Domestic corporations
162
 in the United States may consolidate their 
returns under an affiliated group concept of eighty percent or more common control and 
ownership.  The consolidated return statute precludes foreign corporations from consolidating 
with domestic corporations.
163
  Subject to limitations that prevent taxpayers from trafficking in 
carryovers of losses
164
 consolidation enables the consolidated taxpayer to offset income from one 
member of the group with losses from another member of the group.  Under CCCTB 
consolidation, but not United States consolidation because transfer pricing is a cross-border 
concern and the United States does not permit foreign corporations to consolidate with domestic 
corporations, the consolidation eliminates those intra group transactions that generate transfer 
pricing concerns.   
 
                                                 
156
 I.R.C. §482 (permitting the IRS to reallocate tax items among taxpayers in order to prevent tax avoidance).  
I.R.C. §704(e) (reallocating income in family partnerships to prevent understatement of income to the service 
provider). 
157
 Supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
158
 OECD, discussion draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, supra note 25.  
159
 Presumably the transfer pricing issue is only a related taxpayer problem.  Unrelated taxpayers are likely to set 
prices that do not result in artificial shifting of income from one taxpayer to another in order to exploit lower tax 
rates for one taxpayer although in instances in which rates of tax differ with the type of income for one taxpayer but 
not the other, even unrelated taxpayers may try to shift income types to arbitrage the rate differentials.  I.R.C. 
§704(c) recognizes this unrelated taxpayer problem and prohibits the shifting of gain and loss on contributed 
property among partners in a partnership by taxing built-in gains and losses to the contributing partner when the 
partnership disposes of  the contributed property. 
160
 See discussion of intangible property in the apportionment formula supra in part 3.A.2. 
161
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, at 13. 
162
 I.R.C. §1501 (permitting affiliated groups to file consolidated return); I.R.C. §1504 (defining includible 
corporation in an affiliated group as 80 percent voting and value). 
163
 I.R.C. §1504(b)(3) (excluding foreign corporations from the definition of includible corporation). 
164
 I.R.C. §§382, 383(b), for example, that limit deductibility of net operating losses and capital losses on change of 
ownership of a corporation. 
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Both the United States consolidated return rules and the CCCTB Proposal address only 
entity groups but a GUGIT should include a common enterprise concept for individuals and 
entities and individuals together as well as entities.  In the United States, only in the cases of 
married individuals,
165
 where joint tax filing may be beneficial, and minors and their parents,
166
 
where the community would suffer the tax detriment of a higher rate, do the taxable income, tax 
rates, and losses of one individual impact the taxable income, tax rates, and losses of any other 
individual expressly.  Nevertheless, many other communities of interest among individuals exist, 
including cohabiting, but unmarried, individuals, some related, some unrelated, who may share 
expenses and income, but the Code does not take them into account.  Taxpayers in the United 
States may elect to split income and deductions of various types through a variety of tax 
transparent or semi-transparent entities when splitting may be beneficial to them and avoid tax 
transparency when splitting might be detrimental.  Other provisions prevent members of a family 
from deducting losses on sales of property from certain family members to others,
167
 but those 
provisions do not encompass other communities of interest and other transactions.  The GUGIT 
may afford the opportunity to revisit those underlying tax law assumptions about relationships 
and define the community in a broader and possibly more contemporary manner including 
cohabitation, income and expense sharing, common economic plans and goals, or even acting in 
concert as the securities laws view shareholder groups,
 168
 for examples. 
 
While a high common ownership threshold might prevent taxpayers from using the 
GUGIT to their advantage,
169
 the high threshold also limits the GUGIT’s ability to prevent 
taxpayers’ manipulation of transactions within a non-consolidated interest group.  In the United 
States it is more difficult for taxpayers to elect to combine as a single taxpayer than it is for the 
taxing agency to combine taxpayers in order to disregard transactions or structures that are 
beneficial to the taxpayer.  Varying lower thresholds for determining relatedness and disallowing 
losses on transactions between related taxpayers permeate the United States tax law.
170
  And 
because the United States has had a graduated rate scale applicable to corporations, it also has an 
anti-abuse rule to prevent the proliferation of unconsolidated corporate taxpayers to capture 
multiple sets of graduated rates.
171
   
 
                                                 
165
 Married individuals may elect to file a joint return of their combined income.  I.R.C. §6013.  Whether or not 
married individuals elect to file jointly, their marital status affects the rates of tax applicable to each spouse.  I.R.C. 
§1(d).  The marital status also prevents spouses from making different elections on itemization of deductions.  I.R.C. 
§63(c)(6). 
166
 I.R.C. §1(g) (tacking the investment income of minors to their parents’ (or highest earning parent’s) income for 
purposes of determining the rate of tax applicable to the minor. 
167
 I.R.C. §267 (disallowing losses on sales between certain family members among other transactions). 
168
 Section 14(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), 15 USCS 78n(d)(2) 
(defining person to include various people acting in concert in the acquisition of securities, whether or not they form 
a formal partnership or other entity). 
169
 See discussion in text accompanying notes 161 to 163 supra.   
170
 I.R.C. §267, for example, denies losses to taxpayers who bear, directly or indirectly, a more than 50 percent 
ownership relationship to one another. 
171
 I.R.C. §1561(a)(1) (denying multiple sets of rate brackets to component members of a controlled group of 
corporations defined in I.R.C. §1563 as 80 percent parent-subsidiary ownership or when 5 or fewer persons (not 
including most entities) own a 50 percent overlapping voting ownership or value ownership). 
 © Copyright 2013 Henry Ordower  
Utopian GUGIT Visions  Page 32 
 
Regarding multiple taxpayers as a single taxpayer sometimes benefits the taxpayers by 
allowing them to use the losses of one to offset income of another.  On other occasions, the 
conflation of taxpayers prevents them from controlling the placement of income with their 
transfer prices and the timing of the deductions that otherwise might arise from transactions 
between them.  Careful planning sometimes permits taxpayers to seize the economic benefits but 
avoid the economic detriments of their relationships.  In choosing a threshold of common 
ownership or relatedness, designers of the GUGIT must consider whether the GUGIT should 
follow the pattern of requiring a higher threshold for the benefits of consolidation than the 
threshold for disregarding separateness to prevent artificial diminution of tax liability.
172
  In the 
United States the use of differing thresholds to combat various tax planning opportunities has led 
to a cacophony of anti-avoidance type rules.
173
  Those loss disallowance and other anti-
avoidance rules target communities of interests that taxpayers exploit to diminish their tax 
liability.  The CCCTB Proposal enhances its enterprise concept by embedding a transfer pricing 
anti-avoidance concept for transactions between enterprises that have overlapping control but are 
not members of the same group.
174
  The “community of interest” or “acting in concert” test that 
this paper recommends would provide the tax agency flexibility in identifying and preventing tax 
planning opportunities that inflexible numerical standards provide.
175
 
 
Other approaches to the problem suggest themselves as well.  Rather than relying on 
thresholds of overlapping ownership to prevent tax manipulation, the United States treasury 
regulations interpreting and supplementing the substantial economic effect partnership tax 
statute
176
 turned to a present value analysis of the impact of allocations that did not correspond to 
the taxpayers’ interests in the partnership.  Under that regulation:177 
 
                                                 
172
 With the term “artificial” this paper refers to a tax structure that produces a tax benefit without affecting the 
underlying economic transaction.  The CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Article 80 at 46 uses the “artificial” 
terminology in its anti-abuse rule. 
173
 Some use a more than 50 percent test (I.R.C. §267 for losses on sales between related entities); others an 
unspecified common control test (I.R.C. §482 for transfer prices between commonly controlled entities and 
individuals).  Many of the anti-avoidance rules include a series of complex constructive ownership rules.  I.R.C. 
§318 applicable to I.R.C. §302 redemptions of shares, but I.R.C. §544 uses different constructive ownership rules 
for determining the number of shareholders for personal holding company tax rules.  . 
174
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Articles 78-9 at 45 (defining associated enterprises and forcing accrual of 
income in transactions between associated enterprises where the transaction has conditions that differ from those 
that would have arisen in between unrelated taxpayers). 
175
 Taxpayers may assert, as they have with general anti-avoidance rules (“GAARs”), infra note 179 and 
accompanying text, that flexible standards leave uncertainty in the application of the tax laws in violation of 
constitutional standards.  As with GAARs, such flexibility is essential to combatting the technically correct 
application of rigid tax rules for aggressive tax planning that has plagued the United States for many years.  
Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 40, at 92. 
176
 I.R.C. §704(b) (requiring that partnership allocations of income and deduction among the partners in a 
partnership have substantial economic effect).  The statute requires that allocations not having substantial economic 
effect be disregarded and the items of income and deduction be allocated according to the partners’ interests in the 
partnership.  The statute leaves to the Department of the Treasury the task of defining substantial economic effect.  
Treas. reg. §1.704-1 and 2 seek to define substantial economic effect and provide a safe harbor of permissible 
allocation structures. 
177
 Treas. reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (providing rules on the substantiality of allocations). 
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the economic effect of an allocation (or allocations) is not substantial if, at the 
time the allocation becomes part of the partnership agreement, (1) the after-tax 
economic consequences of at least one partner may, in present value terms, be 
enhanced compared to such consequences if the allocation (or allocations) were 
not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a strong likelihood 
that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner will, in present value 
terms, be substantially diminished compared to such consequences if the 
allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the partnership agreement. 
 
Similarly, recognizing that tax planners are likely to find weaknesses in the CCCTB, the CCCTB 
Proposal embeds a general anti-abuse rule providing:  “[a]rtificial transactions carried out for the 
sole purpose of avoiding taxation shall be ignored for the purposes of calculating the tax 
base.”178  This anti-abuse rule is a member of the growing family of general anti-avoidance rules 
(GAARs) to which many jurisdictions have turned to help curb aggressive tax planning.
179
  A 
GAAR enables the taxing agency to look beyond the express statutory language to ascertain 
whether the economic substance of a transaction corresponds to its form and the intention of the 
statute itself.   
 
It is probable that even if the GUGIT includes differing thresholds for combining 
taxpayers and disregarding tax avoidance transactions, the GUGIT nevertheless will need some 
kind of more general anti-avoidance provisions whether broad language like that of a GAAR,
180
 
present value analysis like that of the United States partnership allocation rule, or the “acting in 
concert” standard.  Without a GAAR, technical compliance with the GUGIT’s rules will yield 
opportunities to structure around the purpose of the GUGIT.  Rather than attempting to anticipate 
tax avoidance opportunities with detailed statutory rules, differing relationship thresholds for 
income and loss, and special mechanical rules, a principles-based approach like a GAAR would 
provide the greatest flexibility to combat unforeseeable tax planning opportunities.  Insofar as the 
GUGIT redesigns thinking about taxes along global lines, traditional arguments against a 
GAAR
181
 should give way to the need for a unified and effective approach to protect the integrity 
and fairness of this new taxing system.  
 
C. Residence change and expatriation.  To the extent that the GUGIT uses a 
residence concept in distributing income among jurisdictions and tax rates differ materially from 
one jurisdiction to another, taxpayers will try to avoid the higher tax jurisdiction by shifting 
residence.  For corporations, where corporate residence is a function of place of incorporation 
and nominal headquarters, rather than actual place of management, change of the country of 
incorporation to reduce taxes is a sensible decision.  If the residence test is a matter of the place 
                                                 
178
 CCCTB Proposal, supra note 37, Article 80 at 46 (ignoring artificial transactions carried out to avoid tax but not 
transactions representing alternative structures, one of which generates a more favorable tax outcome than another). 
179
 For example, in Germany §42 Abgabeordnung, in Sweden Skatteflyktslagen, in the United State I.R.C. §7701(o) 
(codifying an economic substance concept).   
180
 Id.    and for the present value test, supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
181
 Supra note 175.  Ambiguities of any statutory language creating uncertainty in application of a statute aside, 
most, perhaps all, taxpayers who structure to avoid the application of a specific statute know that they are avoiding 
taxes rather than altering the economic substance of their transactions.  Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra 
note 40, at 98. 
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of actual management, a decision to relocate the corporation for tax purposes affects the physical 
location of the principal managers and becomes a far more difficult move. 
 
In the case of an individual taxpayer, changing one’s residence may have little 
significance if one may retain the national citizenship to which one has an emotional and 
linguistic bond.  In fact, the change of residence might have independent significance
182
 like a 
retirement to a country with a more pleasant climate or a lower cost of living, rather than a tax 
avoidance purpose.
183
  Countries with territorial tax systems historically permitted their citizens 
and taxable residents to emigrate and free themselves from the home country’s income taxes 
although increasingly countries have turned to continuation taxes to prevent tax emigrations.
184
   
 
With its tax on worldwide income of citizens and permanent residents, the United States, 
on the other hand, requires that the citizen renounce her citizenship and emigrate in order to 
become free from the United States’ income tax.185  Relinquishing one’s citizenship would seem 
a much higher emotional price to pay to avoid taxes than simply changing one’s residence while 
retaining citizenship.  Nevertheless, some Americans do renounce.
186
   
 
 In order to combat change of residence to avoid taxes, countries have adopted two basic 
approaches:  exit taxes and continuation taxes.  An exit tax requires the taxpayer at the time of 
expatriation to include in income all the net gain the taxpayer would have included in income if 
she had sold her assets at their respective fair market values on the date of residence change or 
expatriation.
187
  Under a continuation tax, the departing or expatriating taxpayer, corporate or 
individual, remains subject to the income tax of the country from which she or it departed or 
expatriated for several years following the expatriation.
188
 
 
 The proposed formula for apportionment of trade or business income under the GUGIT 
removes most of the incentives for expatriating since it apportions income based upon some 
factors that remain unchanged following expatriation – destination sales and beneficial 
ownership.
189
  The underlying enterprise owners themselves would have to change residence or 
expatriate to shift the beneficial ownership factor to another country.  As a practical matter, 
relocation of property and payroll to a low tax jurisdiction is likely to be a matter of business 
                                                 
182
 Supra note 133 and accompanying text on acts of independent significance. 
183
 Many Canadians move to Florida for much of the winter (but tend to keep their period of residence under 183 
days to avoid becoming U.S. residents for tax purposes).  Many Americans retire to border areas of Mexico to 
capture the lower Mexican cost of living.  Scandinavians, Germans, Dutch, and British select winter or all year 
residence in Spain and Mediterranean islands to avoid their harsh northern climates. 
184
 Infra   note 188 and accompanying text. 
185
 Treas. reg. §1.1-1(a) (taxing resident and nonresident U.S. citizens on their worldwide incomes).  
186
 Supra note 134. 
187
 I.R.C. §877A (imposing a tax on individual expatriations).  
188
 I.R.C. §7874 (taxing in the U.S. the inversion gain of an entity and defining inversion gain as gain from the sale 
of assets or income from licensing property to a related party for 10 years following expatriation);  I.R.C. §877 
(taxing an expatriating individual on effectively connected income for 10 years following expatriation); 3. Kap. 3 § 
3., 7 § Inkomstskattelag (Sweden), supra note 109, (taxing expatriates on their income from all sources (obegränsad 
skattskyldighet) if they continue to have substantial connection with Sweden presumptively for 5 years following 
expatriation). 
189
 Supra part 3.A.1. and 4. 
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economics, lower wages and property costs, rather than tax avoidance.  Similarly, if the GUGIT 
allocates an individual’s income based on intended impact or relative periods of residence,190 
change of residence or expatriation may have little effect on the taxpayer’s tax rate on personal 
services income since both factors are independent of the taxpayer’s permanent residence.  
Investment income follows residence more closely and is likely to shift with residence.   
 
Given the centralization of tax reporting and collection, a continuation tax may be more 
administrable than an exit tax to counter tax departures and expatriations.  A continuation tax 
does not require immediate asset valuations with their uncertainties for all but the most liquid 
assets.  A continuation tax also requires taxpayers to cut ties with the home country if they wish 
to become free from the continuation tax.
191
  Ultimately, change of residence and expatriation 
will cease to be an issue if tax rates harmonize as one would expect them to do under a GUGIT. 
 
D. Language and Currency Translation.  There are six official languages of the 
United Nations:  Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish,
192
 but the EU operates 
currently in twenty-three official languages.  However, the EU does not translate documents 
automatically into all twenty-three but relies primarily on English, French, and German as its 
procedural languages.
193
  The IRS provides some documents in Spanish, Chinese, Korean, 
Vietnamese, and Russian.
194
  The quality of computerized translation is imperfect but 
improving,
195
 and there is no reason to assume that the quality will not continue to improve over 
the next several years.  The model of working in a handful of languages having wide usage and 
providing translation into other languages when needed seems a reasonable approach for the 
GUGIT.   
 
English tends to predominate in international business transactions and has become an 
unofficial worldwide common language.
196
  Invariably, TIEAs have an English language official 
text based upon the OECD model.
197
  While this article does not suggest that the GUGIT use 
only English, as a practical matter, the group that will design the GUGIT is likely to conduct 
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 Supra part 3.A.5., especially text accompanying and following note 139. 
191
 The U.S. continuation tax under I.R.C. §877(c)(2)(B) excepts dual nationals from the continuation tax only if 
they maintain no substantial contacts with the U.S.  Similarly, the Swedish continuation tax holds expatriates to 
taxability in Sweden on their income from all sources for the 5 year continuation if they maintain significant 
contacts with Sweden, including, for example, continuing conduct of a trade or business, possession of a year round 
residence, family, and so forth.  3. Kap. 7 § Inkomstskattelag (Sweden), supra note 109.  
192
 UN Official Languages at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/languages.shtml/. 
193
 See Languages on the official EU website at http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/eu-
languages_en.htm where it explains:  “[d]ue to time and budgetary constraints, relatively few working documents 
are translated into all languages. The European Commission employs English, French and German in general as 
procedural languages, whereas the European Parliament provides translation into different languages according to 
the needs of its Members.” 
194
 See the IRS Multilingual gateway at 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=224594,00.html?navmenu=menu3. 
195
 Google translate currently offers translation between 64 languages, including several substantially obsolete 
languages like Yiddish.  Available at http://translate.google.com/.   
196
 Seth Mydans, Across cultures, English is the word, The New York Times (May 14, 2007); The triumph of 
English:  A world empire by other means, The Economist (December 20, 2001) (available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/883997?Story_ID=883997).   
197
 OECD model TIEAs, supra note 89. 
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negotiations primarily in English
198
 and generate a single language text for the GUGIT initially 
before translating it into other languages.  While translations into many languages may become 
necessary for users, presumably the GUGIT will have one or at most a handful of official 
primary texts to which other language users may refer if the translations into their languages are 
ambiguous or erroneous.  Selection of the official language is politically charged, but historical 
negotiations to create an artificial international language always failed and people who have had 
to communicate in international settings generally have turned to French or English except when 
they had a closer common second language.
199
  
 
Despite the existence of multiple numeral systems,
200
 most countries use the common 
European system of so-called Arabic numerals alongside any national system.  Moreover, the 
GUGIT will rely on electronic numerals.  Data processing translates data input (without regard to 
the numeral system appearing at the data entry point) into a common electronic data 
representation that can be translated into any numeral system without the uncertainties and 
ambiguities of language translation.  Taxpayers and third party reporters will transmit primarily 
numerical data electronically in certain sequences or positions in order to comply with their 
obligations under a GUGIT.  The electronic data entry protocols will reject data that does not 
sensibly fit the data entry field so that in most instances, language will be necessary only to the 
explanatory material to instruct the person entering the data how to use the data entry fields.   
 
Undoubtedly there will be disagreements on interpretation of obligations that the taxing 
statutes create, as there always are with tax statutes, but translation of the statutes from one 
language to another seems unlikely to become a principal source of those disagreements.  There 
probably will not be so much more interpretational uncertainty created by translation errors and 
ambiguities than there is today with the language of single country laws and regulations. 
 
Currency translation may be a more serious concern than language translation, since 
relative currency values fluctuate from day to day while the meaning of words does not.  For 
most taxpayers, currency translation will be unnecessary.  Most will not engage in international 
commerce so their income will be in their local currency, as will be withholding, and the 
currency of the tax payment obligation.  Computation of the tax base where income and expense 
involve multiple currencies is more problematic.   
 
The CCCTB Proposal requires translation into the Euro of all transactions on the last day 
of the taxable year at the average rate of exchange that the European Central Bank determines for 
the year unless the company or enterprise is located in a single member state that does not use 
the Euro.
201
  Within the EU, the decision to use an average rate of exchange over a year’s time 
makes sense because the other European currencies fluctuate within a narrow band relative to the 
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 As the CCCTB WG conducted its negotiations. 
199
 For example, the second language in the Soviet Republics historically was Russian, however, since the 1990 
change in the economic systems, those former Soviet Republics increasingly have used English in business dealings 
if not governmental functions. 
200
 Omniglot, Numerals in many different writing systems (available at 
http://www.omniglot.com/language/numerals.htm) (listing 23 different numeral systems). 
201
 CCCTB Proposal Article 22, 2, supra note 37 at 26. 
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Euro.
 202
  The region is monetarily stabile.  A worldwide tax base will be more complicated since 
currency translation goes to both the distribution of the base and the use of withheld and 
estimated tax payments.  Instability of currencies and lack of convertibility are both problematic.  
The problem of convertibility no longer is insurmountable.  All major currencies currently are 
either convertible or on their way to full convertibility.
203
   
 
While a common international currency ultimately might follow from a GUGIT, until 
that happens it will be necessary to convert all transactions into a single measure in order to 
facilitate distribution of the tax base.  The taxpayer may select a functional currency for reporting 
revenue and expenditures.  Regular use of an artificial currency pegged to a major world 
currency, usually the United States dollar or the Euro has become commonplace.
204
  Several 
countries use the United States dollar for their currency in order to control exchange rate 
fluctuations that historically plagued their own currencies.
205
  Frequently, businesses in countries 
with unstable currencies state prices in a major, stable currency but then convert at the rate of 
exchange at the moment of sale.
206
  Taxpayers also might choose their home jurisdiction’s 
currency because the taxpayer maintains books and records in that currency. 
 
Formulary distribution of income among taxing jurisdictions requires relative currency 
stability unless the taxpayer never actually uses money earned in one jurisdiction to pay expenses 
in another.
 
  In the absence of cross-border payments, translation of income and expenditure at an 
average rate should result in a correct distribution of income and tax burden.
207
  In the presence 
of cross border expenditures, however, use of an average rate of exchange over a full annual 
accounting period only works well in the context of narrow band currency fluctuation such as 
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 EC, Economic and Financial Affairs, What is ERM II? (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/erm2/index_en.htm).  Members of ERM II, most of which 
joined the Euro zone, agreed to a maximum fluctuation within fifteen percent.  Denmark maintains the range at 2.25 
percent and Latvia at 1 percent.  The UK and Sweden are not part of ERM II, but the Swedish krona generally 
fluctuates relative to the euro within the 15 percent range from the base rate, but the UK pound sterling has 
fluctuated more widely from its base rate. 
203
 Bloomberg News, Yuan Will Be Fully Convertible by 2015, Chinese Officials Tell EU Chamber (September 8, 
2011) (available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-08/yuan-to-be-fully-convertible-by-2015-eu-
chamber.html) (announcing a target for full Yuan convertibility); Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, V. 
Development and Regulation of Financial Markets, see the Capital Account portion of the report (available at 
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=984) (discussing liberalization of the capital 
markets and convertibility). 
204
 For example, the Asian Clearing Union permits clearance of transactions either in ACU dollars or euros.  See the 
Asian Clearing Union website at http://www.asianclearingunion.org/Introduction.aspx. 
205
 Most recently, Ecuador. 
206
 Zambia, for example. 
207
 To illustrate:  taxpayer elects currency A as its functional currency.  Taxpayer earns 1000 units of net income in 
currency A, and 100 units of net income in currency B as well.  On the first day of the year, currencies A and B 
traded at one to one, on the last day of the year A and B trade at 10 to one and the average for the year is eight to 
one.  Taxpayer earned the 100 units of B on the first day of the year and 1000 units of income in currency A on the 
last day of the year.  The average exchange rate for the year is the 8 to 1.  Assume countries A and B have a 50% tax 
rate.  Using the average exchange rate and the taxpayer’s functional currency, the taxpayer earned 800 units of A in 
country B, and 1000 units of A in country A, even though when earned the amounts were identical in value.  The 
GUGIT would allocate 5/9 of the tax base of 1800, 1000 units to country A for a 500 unit tax (the correct amount), 
and 800 to B translated at the average rate of 8 to 100 B units for a tax of 50 B units (also correct). 
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that present in the EU and its member states.
208
  Average exchange rates work less well when a 
currency lacks a ready foreign exchange market because the country has a high rate of inflation 
or the economy and, accordingly, the currency otherwise is unstable.  In those instances, where a 
taxpayer uses one currency to pay an expense in another currency, the tax base distribution 
works correctly if the taxpayer uses a cash basis of accounting and the actual exchange rates of 
currency conversion.  Government restrictions on outbound convertibility further complicate 
distribution of income and payment of taxes outside the restricted country.
209
   
 
Fixed exchange rates would permit the GUGIT to distribute income among jurisdictions 
seamlessly and fairly, but those fixed exchange rates must be a function of stabile economies 
rather than artificial controls that depart from economic reality.  A single worldwide currency is 
the best choice in light of increasing interconnectedness of national economies.   
 
Part 4.  Toward Uniform Tax Rules.  A GUGIT requires uniform rules of inclusion and 
deduction in the income producing portion of the taxpayer’s world.210  Variations in those rules 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction frustrate the GUGIT’s objective of eliminating the possibility of 
both multiple inclusions of the same income and no inclusion of income in any jurisdiction.  The 
GUGIT must construct a single tax base to distribute among the jurisdictions in which the 
taxpayer is active.  A simple example might be that commuting expenses be uniformly 
deductible or non-deductible as business expenses.
211
  If the GUGIT design makes commuting 
expenses non-deductible, a country would remain free to allow them against that country’s share 
of the uniform tax base but could not take them into account in determining the distributable tax 
base itself. 
 
The states of the United States have used formulary apportionment for many years.  They 
have employed the federal income tax base as a uniform point of departure for apportionment
212
 
but have failed to achieve complete uniformity of base and apportionment formula.
213
  Each state 
adjusts the federal base in state specific ways to construct its own tax base to apportion according 
to its apportionment formula.  The CCCTB Proposal, on the other hand, lays down principles for 
the computation of a single uniform tax base without country specific variations.
214
  While the 
                                                 
208
 See note 202 supra.  
209
 Governments do not restrict inbound movement of foreign exchange although many have prohibited their citizens 
from holding foreign exchange, thus requiring conversion into the local currency for legal receipts of foreign 
exchange, for example, all the Soviet bloc countries before 1990.   
210
 Countries may provide additional deductions for the non-income producing part of the taxpayer’s world.  These 
deductions in U.S. tax parlance would fit into the current group of itemized (or below the line) deductions under 
I.R.C. §63 and might include such items as a deduction for the interest on a home mortgage.   
211
 U.S. tax law considers commuting expenses to be personal, living, and family expenses that under I.R.C. §262 
are non-deductible.  German tax law views commuting costs as necessary to the taxpayer’s income production and, 
accordingly, deductible.  Einkommensteuergesetz (Neugefasst durch Bek. v. 8.10.2009 I 3366, 3862; zuletzt 
geändert durch Art. 3 G v. 8.5.2012 I 1030) (German Income Tax Law) §9, ¶1, Nr. 4 (permitting a deduction for 
commuting costs as trade or business expenses).   
212
 The state of Missouri, for example, commences the computation of the corporate tax with federal taxable income 
and then makes modifications applicable to Missouri before apportioning the income.  Form MO-1120, line 1- 4 
(federal taxable income and modifications), line 10 (apportioned Missouri taxable income) (available at 
http://dor.mo.gov/forms/MO-1120_Fillable_2011.pdf). 
213
 Supra, note 99 and accompanying text. 
214
 Supra, note 37, Chapter IV at 22-24.  
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concept of a multi-national uniform tax base might have seemed unimaginable in the past, broad 
acceptance of the CCCTB Proposal, albeit with modifications,
215
 brings the concept into the 
imaginable.   
 
Both accounting principles and substantive tax rules now tend to converge across national 
borders.  While the United States applies generally accepted accounting principles, a rule based 
system of financial reporting, to public disclosure, European and other countries use the 
principles based system of the international financial reporting standards.  Whenever a United 
States issuer of securities included financial results from a European affiliate in its financial 
statements or a non-United States issuer wished to list its securities on a United States exchange, 
they had to translate the accounting results from IFRS to GAAP.  The converse also was true for 
issuers based in the United States and using GAAP but wishing to list in Europe.  In 2008, 
however, the SEC announced and published a “Roadmap” for use of IFRS by United States 
issuers possibly as early as 2014.
216
  In the Roadmap the SEC acknowledged that increasing 
integration of international financial markets and international acceptance of IFRS made it 
necessary for the United States to consider seriously whether adoption of IFRS would be in the 
best interests of United States issuers and their shareholders.
217
  Although the SEC’s final staff 
report on IFRS did not conclude that IFRS would be in the best interests of United States issuers 
and shareholders, neither did it reject continuing convergence and future possible transition to 
IFRS.  The report recommends continuing SEC involvement with development of IFRS.
218
  
Convergence and integration of financial reporting standards worldwide certainly is in process 
but possibly at a slower pace than earlier SEC statements suggested. 
 
The last several decades also have seen increasing borrowing of substantive tax rules and 
convergence of tax concepts.  While the CCCTB Proposal perhaps is the most immediately 
visible of the developments, the decade of the 1990s saw the construction of income tax systems 
in the formerly centrally planned economies of the Soviet republics and satellite states.  Tax 
experts from free market economic systems assisted in the development of the new tax systems 
and modeled them from their own experience.
219
  Similarly, the CCCTB WG solicited the views 
of experts from many countries in constructing the CCCTB.  Inevitably neither the tax systems in 
the former Soviet sphere of influence nor the CCCTB copied any single existing tax system.  
Rather both projects were convergence projects that selected elements from several systems. 
 
In many instances, systems and concepts converge as countries experience similar 
problems or concerns with their systems and look to other countries for possible solutions.  
Legislatures and courts have examined debates and decisions in other countries for guidance on 
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 EP CCCTB resolutions, supra note 38.   
216
 SEC Proposed Rulemaking, Roadmap, supra note 12. 
217
 Id.    
218
 SEC, Final Staff Report, Work Plan for the Consideration of Incorporating International Financial Reporting 
Standards into the Financial Reporting System for U.S. Issuers, supra note 12 (July 13, 2012). 
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 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab, The Tax Reform Experiment in Transitional Countries, 53 
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 273 (2000) (describing tax reform approaches and international assistance in tax reform in 
the formerly centrally planned economies); Yolanda K. Kodrzycki and Eric M. Zolt, Tax Issues Arising from 
Privatization in the Formerly Socialist Countries, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 609 (1994) (discussing importance of 
taxation to stable economies and the development of tax systems there). 
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and solutions to problems that confront them as well as the legislatures and courts of the other 
countries.  Among striking examples of this phenomenon are GAARs
220
 and controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules.
221
  Neither GAARs nor CFC rules are identical in all jurisdictions but 
all have fundamental similarities.  GAARs empower the tax administrator to disregard the form 
of a transaction having a tax avoidance purpose and substitute a different tax outcome than that 
the taxpayer wanted,
222
  CFC rules prevent some shifting of income to low tax jurisdictions 
where a compelling business reason for the placement of the income is absent.  The income has 
no immediate relationship with the jurisdiction in which it arises.  Similarly, the OECD has taken 
on several anti-tax avoidance projects that tend to make rules across national borders more 
uniform, including transfer pricing methodologies
223
 and exchanges of tax information.
224
  In 
addition, the stark historic differences between schedular and global tax systems have tended to 
converge into hybrid systems,
225
 while rate competition has reduced corporate and often 
individual income tax rates throughout most of the economically, developed world.   
 
While nations continue to enact and maintain tax rules that differ from those of other 
nations, most of those rules exist as a matter of internal political compromise rather than as 
reflections of deeply embedded fundamental national principles that render them unalterable.  
Even when exhibiting clear policy choices, the rules are details not basic structural elements of 
an income tax system.  Resistance to enactment of a GUGIT will come as no surprise, but that 
resistance is likely at best to reflect principled differences of opinion with the GUGIT design 
group’s negotiated compromises on specific tax rules and at worst political posturing alongside 
some fear of sacrificing national autonomy.  Thus, if local enactment of an internationally 
designed GUGIT leaves nations the choice of accepting or rejecting the GUGIT as a whole 
only,
226
 leaving no opportunity to reject or modify specific items of the GUGIT, countries are 
less likely to isolate themselves by refusing to join if their neighboring states and major 
economic powers join. 
 
Part 5.  Economic Displacement from the New GUGIT.  In 1981 when the United States 
enacted favorable new tax rules for depreciation, the average price of depreciable real property 
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 Supra, note 175 and accompanying text. 
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 See, generally, KPMG LLP, Controlled Foreign Company Taxation Regimes in Selected Countries:  Report 
Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation (April 2008) (available at 
http://www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca/06/rr-re/RR5%20-%20KPMG%20-%20en%20-%20final%20-%20090608.pdf) 
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 Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 40, at 94-103 (discussing the growth of GAARs internationally). 
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 OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 24 (providing guidelines for transfer pricing restraints); and 
the OECD announced its intention to publish a white paper on standardization and simplification of transfer pricing 
documentation.  Julie Martin, OECD to Tackle Transfer Pricing Documentation, 2012 TNT 149-4 (August 2, 2012). 
224
 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 8 and model TIEA, supra note 87. 
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 Sylvain R.F. Plasschaert, SCHEDULAR, GLOBAL AND DUALISTIC PATTERNS OF INCOME TAXATION 17–24 (1988) 
(discussing schedular tax systems); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 49–
50 (1996).   
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 A problem with uniform laws is that jurisdictions often modify features of those laws so that they are not truly 
uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
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increased x percent,
227
 and depreciable real property similarly lost value when the depreciation 
rules became less favorable again.
228
  When the rules became more favorable, owners of 
depreciable real property received a windfall gain if they sold the property insofar as they bought 
their property when rules were less favorable, and, accordingly, commanded a lower price.  
When the depreciation rules became less favorable, owners of depreciable real property suffered 
a loss in value of their properties.  That loss in value probably was particularly noticeable to 
those who acquired their properties during the period of more favorable rules when there was a 
spike in value.  At the time of each change in depreciation rules, there were economic 
displacements.  Changing rules causes those displacements although well-functioning markets 
anticipate changes and take them into account gradually or sooner than the change event so that 
the displacements are less remarkable.   
 
Changes require other changes to compensate for the first changes.  When the United 
States tax depreciation rules became more favorable, income tax revenues from the operation of 
real estate declined.  On the other hand, initially there may have been more sales of real estate at 
taxable gains because a purchase would enable the purchaser to use the new, favorable 
depreciation rules and the seller to capture the spike in value that the rule change created.  If the 
tax from gain did not offset the loss of revenue from favorable depreciation rules, other rule 
changes or rate changes would become necessary to make up for the lost tax revenue so that the 
government could continue to provide services.  From time to time rules for budgeting tax 
changes that diminish revenue in the United States require revenue offsets.  Under those rules a 
legislator may not introduce legislation to increase an existing or create a new tax benefit without 
complementary legislation to offset the revenue loss.
229
  Revenue neutrality for tax changes does 
not mean revenue neutrality for taxpayers.  Changes create winners and losers even if on a 
governmental revenue measure no change occurred.  Stabile rules do not.   
 
Economic displacements will accompany the shift to a GUGIT.  Economic displacements 
also accompany any change in substantive tax laws (and probably procedural tax laws as 
well).
230
  Taxpayers, who have exploited tax planning opportunities such as transfer pricing to 
shift income to low tax jurisdictions, will lose that tax avoidance opportunity and probably pay 
more tax.  Those taxpayers arguably should not have had the opportunity to shift income in the 
first instance.  In addition, the diminished deadweight loss of tax planning and tax administration 
to prevent such tax planning offsets some or all the economic displacement although the 
beneficiaries of the economic benefit may not be identical with those losing the tax planning 
benefit.  Like all tax changes, adoption of the GUGIT will produce winners and losers. 
 
 For the average taxpayer, little will change.  Enhanced withholding under the centralized 
collection system may deprive some taxpayers of the financial float they enjoyed by waiting until 
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 Marcus & Millichap, Research Review Trends Report:  Commercial Real Estate Review:  30 Year Look Back 
(available at http://vitorinogroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CommercialREReview.pdf) (discussing impact 
of tax law changes on commercial real estate).  
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 Id.    
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 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was Title 13 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.L. 
101-508) (including pay as you go rules (Paygo) requiring tax legislation that reduced revenue to include an 
offsetting revenue increase).  
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 Supra, note 227 and accompanying text. 
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tax payment time to pay.
231
  Exclusions and inclusions in income may not be identical to what 
they are currently, but most of the changes will not have a recurrent effect on any specific 
taxpayer.  If there is a strong policy reason for a specific exclusion – subsidization at national 
level for local governments through the interest exclusion,
232
 for example – a direct subsidy 
would work equally well possibly without as much deadweight loss.
233
 
 
 Changes in the cost recovery rules, depreciation and amortization, may cause more 
significant economic displacement as they alter the underlying value of property.  Yet, if the 
United States is representative of the frequency with which the legislature alters those rules, the 
resulting economic displacement if far from unusual.   
 
 More significant for countries that tax on worldwide income, like the United States does, 
might be the implicit shift to territoriality.  Those countries will receive their shares of the 
taxpayer’s uniform tax base but not the bonus over the tax rate that other countries may charge 
on their shares of that base.
234
  On the other hand, the United States is likely to be on the 
receiving end of tax base on the destination sales and beneficial ownership factors in the formula.  
Disruption of taxpayers’ opportunity to shift income through transfer pricing is also likely to 
increase the share of the tax base allocated to the United States, so that the “deferral” opportunity 
diminishes
235
 and temporary tax reductions to encourage repatriation of earnings become 
unnecessary.
 236
   
 
Part 6.  Conclusion.  Transfer pricing regulation has failed to prevent taxpayers from shifting 
income to low tax jurisdictions, as tax administrators have struggled to challenge those prices.  
GAARs have proliferated worldwide suggesting that existing tax laws are inadequate to staunch 
loss of revenue through sophisticated tax planning.  Commerce has become increasing global and 
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 With current interest rate levels, it is difficult to imagine any significant value to the float from short term tax 
deferral.   
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 I.R.C. §103. 
233
 If in order to sell local government tax exempt bonds, the interest rate must target an income group not subject to 
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income from all sources worldwide)) and allows a credit for taxes paid to foreign countries under I.R.C. §901.  
Whenever the U.S. rate exceeds the foreign rate of tax, the U.S. retains the excess of the U.S. tax on the foreign 
income over the creditable foreign tax, 
235
 Since a corporation’s earnings from the active conduct of business generally are not taxable to its shareholders 
until distributed, unless an anti-avoidance rule like the passive foreign investment company (I.R.C. §1291 et seq.) or 
controlled foreign corporation (I.R.C. §951 et seq.) rules apply, corporate taxpayers seek to defer U.S. taxes by 
shifting income offshore, especially through transfer pricing arrangements.   
236
 In 2004, U.S. legislation effectively reduced the U.S. tax rate repatriated earnings of a controlled foreign 
corporation to a maximum of 5.25% temporarily for a single tax year to encourage investment in the U.S. and 
increase employment in the U.S.  The rate reduction resulted from a dividends received deduction of 85 percent of 
the amount of the dividend if the recipient invested the funds in the U.S. under a domestic reinvestment plan.  I.R.C. 
§965 (added by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, PL 108-357 (Oct. 22, 2004).  Proposed legislation in 2011 
would repeat the decreased rate on repatriation even though the earlier effort seems to have accomplished little to 
stimulate the U.S. economy.  The concept, however, is that deferral traps the revenues offshore and only a rate 
reduction would free them for U.S. use.   
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business ownership no longer national.  With growing regularity, enterprises reach across 
national borders to acquire other enterprises, even very large ones.  Against the backdrop of 
internationalization of commerce, taxation only on a national level seems strangely 
anachronistic.  While not pushing for a global tax regime, tax administrators and national 
legislatures have increased international access to the domestic tax information gathering power.  
Treaties and TIEAs require transmission of large quantities of taxpayer data from national tax 
administrations to tax administrations in other countries.  
 
OECD projects on harmful tax competition
237
 and transfer pricing,
238
 the United States’ 
and other countries’ prosecutions for concealment of assets and income abroad, negotiations with 
various jurisdictions for changes in bank secrecy laws, enactment of FATCA, tax administrators’ 
purchase of stolen secret financial information, and the CCCTB Proposal
239
 all emphasize the 
critical importance of international cooperation on tax matters.  Jurisdictions have become less 
protective of their national sovereignty on tax matters.
240
  The CCCTB Proposal opens the door 
to cross border tax administration.  The momentum to replace obsolescent domestic taxation with 
global taxation reflecting global commerce is growing.  A progressive income tax remains 
conceptually fair and desirable, but the international trend is toward more administrable, and 
regressive, consumption and labor taxes.  A GUGIT might protect the progressive income tax 
and contribute to long term development of global markets with uniform tax rules free from the 
deadweight loss of resources to tax planning.   
 
The limited purpose of this paper has been to identify many of the global conditions that 
lend themselves to and to present a framework for GUGIT development.  The paper’s 
recommendations are utopian or dystopian depending upon the impact that a GUGIT might have 
on the individual reader.  
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 See, generally, Roman Seer and Isabel Gabert, general reporter and ed., MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE (Amsterdam, 2010) (assembling and compiling national reports on exchange of information and mutual 
assistance in tax matters from various European jurisdictions and the United States for the 2009 meeting of the 
European Association of Tax Law Professors). 
